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1.0 Executive Summary
Throughout the Option I period of the Lunar Trans-
portation Facilities and Operations Study (LTFOS),
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company -
Kennedy Space Center (MDSSC-KSC) provided
support to both the Planetary Surface Systems (PSS)
Office at the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA) at the Johnson Space Center
and to the Flight and Ground Systems Projects Of-
rice (Payload Projects Management) at the Kennedy
Space Center. The primary objective of the Option 1
phase of the study was to assist the above NASA
centers in developing Space Exploration Initiative
(SEI) concepts.
MDSSC-KSC conducted three analyses which pro-
vialed launch and landing detail to the proposed ex-
ploration concepts. One analysis, the Lunar Ejecta
Assessment, was conducted to determine the effects
of launch and landing a vehicle in a dusty environ-
ment. Impacts to the base layout as well as the ve-
Tiicle and Surface Support Equipment (SSE) were
identified. It was found that the base elements of
Reference Architecture Option 5A could be pro-
tected from small particles if a 1.5 meter high berm
was erected at the pad perimeter. However, equip-
ment higher than 1.5 meters and equipment located
beyond 375 meters from the landing site could be
struck by large particles.
A second analysis, the Thermal/Micrometeoroid
Protection Trade Study, was refined to determine
the impacts that Reference Architecture Option 5A
would have on thermal/micrometeoroid protection
approaches. It was found that the storage facility
option is still the best protection option. In addition,
mobilizing this facility would reduce the amount of
Extravehicular Tune which would make the storage
facility even more attractive when compared to oth-
er protection options.
The third analysis, the Centaur Prelaunch Procedure
Analysis, used a Centaur prelaunch test and check-
out flow to identify key considerations that would be
important if a Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV) was
to use an expander cycle liquid oxygen-liquid hydro-
gen engine. This assessment indicated that the exist-
ing approaches to conducting prelaunch checkout of
an expander-c/de liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen
is procedurally intensive. Lunar-based engines,
which will see repeated use in a non-terrestrial envi-
ronment, should be designed to minimize hands--on
servicing.
Several "quick look" assessments were also con-
ducted. Most of these were in response to requests
to provide detail to the Mission Analysis and Sys-
tems Engineering trade studies. One quick look
assessment, the Storable Propellant Quick Look
Assessment, was conducted to identify design con-
siderations that should be made if storable propel-
lants were to be used instead of liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen. _is assessment indicates that the
use of storable propellants will not eliminate the
need for surface operations and related SSE. If the
propellants are to be maintained in a liquid state and
vehicle tank pressures are to remain within a reason-
able range, thermal conditioning of the LEVs and
Mars Excursion Vehicles (MEVs) will be required.
The LEV Servicer Maintenance Analysis, provided an
early look at the effort required to maintain an LEV
Servicer on the lunar surface. This analysis indicated
that the reliquefaction and the communication/com-
puter systems of the servicer would incur excessive
number of failures. (Based on the reliability of similar
systems) Recommendations made by this assessment
are 1) explore alternatives to reliquefaaion or increase
the reliquefaction systems reliability to reduce the
number of failures, 2) increase the reliquefaction sys-
tem maintainability to reduce the overall maintenance
times, and 3) increase the computer and communi-
cations systems reliabitity to reduce the number of
failures.
:Also, sup--p6rtwas provided to the PSS Logistics
Manager to develop initial LEV Servicer cost inputs.
The overall PS_ objective was to demonstrate the
viability of using the System Design Utility Model
which will be used to determine logistics support
impacts on the life cycle cost of the SEI program.
Finally, consideration was given to the advanced devel-
opment that must be provided to accomplish a lunar
and/or Mars mission. Inputs regarding the advanced
development test methods and test beds as well as the
schedule, manpower, and cost _ted with an ad-
vanced development program were made. If the LEV
is to be maintained under planetary envL,'onmental
conditions, thermal and fluid management and mainte-
nance concepts will have to be developed.
MDSSC-KSC alsoprovidedsupporttobothMASE
and PSS by reviewingand commenting on architec-
turedocumentsand conceptdefinitionstoensure
. adequate considerations were given to the launch
and landing function of an exploration initiative.
The Lunar Transportation Facilities and Operations
Study, Option I, generated a wide array of products.
These products have been attached to the report as
appendices.
*j
I 1-1
This page intentionallyleft blank
1-2
AeCbO4_L_ImBZ.L D_lJ_m&.,4I
-.._.I
2.0 Introduction
This report documents the results of the Option 1 of
the Lunar Transportation Facilities and Operations
Study (LTFOS) results (NAS10-11567). The Option
I period of the LTFOS had the objectives of per-
forming several tasks for NASA-KSC which were
integrated into the ongoing Space Exploration Initia-
tive (SEI). The tasks can be grouped into four cate-
gories - Analyses and "Quick Look" Assessments,
Logistics Support, Advanced Development Planning,
and Document Reviews.
A summary of the tasks performed under LTFOS
Option 1 are contained in q_able 2-1.
2.1 Analyses and Quick Look Assessments
The Lunar Ejecta Analysis was one of the analyses
that was refined during this period. The analysis was
Table 2-1 LTFOS Option 1 Study Tasks and Products
.. _._`_._._.._:_H_`._:_`:.x_x+:+_:.:_x :.:.>:.:.: :,>:,:,:+x-:,:->: .+:,: :,: : :.:+:.:.:.:.:+:,:.>:,>:.x +:,:-: :-:-:+:.:-:: :+::.>:+:.:.:+:.:.:.:.:+:.:.:,:,:: :.:,:.:,::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :
: :¢_i__:_i;_:_! ii_:i:i:_8!:i: i:i$!:ii!:i8 i: i$i:i: _:i:i:_:?:_:?:_:!::_:i:i: i::f!:i: !:i: i:i:i:i: i: i: i: f':" :":':" :":":";":': ::::::::: ::: ::::: :::: :: :::8 :: :::::::: :8:: ::: :: :: ::: :: ::::" : ,:: :: :: :::: :": :":":":":":':" :+ :":':" :' :":" >:' :" '"" "'''"" "':" :':" :":':':":" ::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: :::::: :::::: ::: ::: ::: :::: :::S :.: ::: :. :: :: :::::: :::::::-:.:._ :: :, ::::::: :: :::::: ::: :: :.:::: :::::. :-: :-:. :-:-:. :. :. :-:.:-:. :. :. :. :. :. :. :.:. :
Lunar Ejecta Analysis Estimates of I_ast damages to SSE and lunar base fscllitJee
Es_rmdas of safe distances from launch site
Rscommeodations for changes to base configuration and protection
concepts
Thermai/Micrometeroid Protection Analysis Thermai/mlcrometeroid protection for Reference Architecture Option 5#,
EVA Assembly Time vs mass considerations for protection
Performarce concerns of o_s coosldered
Analysis on fire Lunar Ap_.at_n of Centaur Iden_dfcation of lunar launch and landing tasks for cryogenic eogines
Prelaunch Procedures
Engine design considerations
Quick Look A,ssessmeo_ in Support of MASE Precursor engineering data needs for lunar w'td Marl
Trade Studies
_x-_ 5A launchancllarclingscenados formanned and unmanned
Launch and kmding taskestimatesOption5A manned and unmanned
vehicles
Quick Look Assessment of MASE Launch and landingconsiderationsforthe _ __ruSurface Architectures Expanding Human Presence, and Evolution Emphasis
S_or_le Propellant Quick look A._n'_rd ld_'_i_'l of lumu"and _ envtrorl_ impacts to
h_ _
Preliminary recomrn_ for SSE
LEV Seo4cer Maintenance Ar_ym Identlrcat_on of .¢le_lity, supportability, and maintm_ace das_gn drivers
for an LEV Servloer
Identt_cat_onof LEV servicer maintenance support requirements
Logistics Inputs to 'd'teSystem Design Utility Model LEV Servioer ¢os_
Preliminary LEV servicer MTBF data
Operations and Logistics Concept Document Launch and _a_ng _ descriptions
Contingency opera.s (launch and landing aborts)
_v_ _ _ing lI_EV _n_ system breakdown
Descriptions of advanced deve_omert test beds
Test bed implementation scheule
Advanced devekc_nent WBS
Advarced development schedule
Task description _'teet_
Advanced development cost es4_
r,. -_-J_ r_u_ _L._,I'_K r_u1 r FB.:._U
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refined to make estimates of the blast damages to
SSE and lunar base facilities that could be expected
from a vehicle taking off and landing on the surface.
Other estimates that were made include safe dis-
tance from the launch site that are required to es-
cape this damage. Where appropriate, recommenda-
tions for changes to the base configuration were
made as well as recommendations for protection
options. The description of this analysis activity and
the results are contained in section 3.1.
Another analysis, The Thermal/micrometeoroid pro-
tection trade study, was also refined during this peri-
od. The description of this analysis activity and the
results are contained in section 3.2.
Engines planned for the LEV are cryogenic oxygen/
hydrogen engines. To gain insight into the types of
tasks that will be required to ready these engines for
launch from the lunar surface, existing Centaur pro-
cedures were reviewed. This review also revealed
some insight into which of the procedures would
have application in the lunar environment. The de-
scription of this analysis activity and the results are
contained in section 3.3.
Throughout the Option 1 period Mission Analysis
and System Engineering (MASE) was conducting
several trade studies. To support this Level 1I activ-
ity, MDSSC-KSC conducted "quick look" asses-
sments and made several inputs as requested by the
Planetary Surface Systems Office (Level HI). As a
result, MDSSC provided inputs to assist MASE in
defining precursor engineering data needs, expend-
able versus reusable vehicles, workload/crew size/au-
tomation, and system commonality considerations.
The description of this analysis activity and the re-
sults are contained in section 3.4.
The JSC PSS Manager of the Launch and Landing
Element (Mr. Joe Riccio) was responsible for con-
ducting propeUant conditioning analyses. The Ther-
mal/Micrometeoroid Protection Trade Study sup-
ported Mr. Riccio's analysis. However, additional
data was required to properly assess the appropriate-
ness of using one type of propellant over another.
MDSSC-KSC was requested to conduct a quick look
assessment on storable propellant Ground Support
Equipment (GSE). The Standard for the Design of
Hypergolic Propellants Ground Support Equipment
(KSC-S'I_-Z-0006A) was used as a baseline to de-
rive appropriate design-to criteria for storable-
propellant storage and conditioning systems. The
description of this activity and the results are con-
tained in section 3.5.
2.2 Logistics Support
During the Option 1 period of LTFOS, a logistics
analysis effort was initiated. The top level goal of
logistics in the conceptual phase is to ensure front-
end consideration of the impacts logistics will have
on the overall program. To satisfy this goal, a LEV
Servicer maintenance analysis was performed. The
objective of this analysis was to influence and impact
LEV Servicer design so reliability, maintainability,
and supportability are optimized to achieve the pro-
gram's operational goals. The Final product was the
derivation of LEV Servicer maintenance support
requirements. The description of this analysis and
the results are contained in section 4.1.
The results of the LEV Servicer maintenance analy-
sis were used to provide launch and landing inputs
to the System Design Utility Model. This model was
adopted by the PSS Office for the generation of lo-
gistics data and the eventual cost of supporting for
the planetary surface infrastructure. Along with the
maintenance requirements, estimates for the cost of
the servicer, drawings, Mean-Ttme-Between-Fai-
lure (MTBF) data, and other logistical parameters
were made. This effort along with the tabular results
of this assessment are contained in section 4.2.
2.3 Advanced Development Planning
As the LTFOS Option 1 period progressed, greater
emphasis was given to advanced development plan-
ning. This effort consisted of two tasks: the defini-
tion of advanced development test beds, and an esti-
mation of the manpower and tasks required to de-
velop a validation model of the LEV servicer. The
results of these tasks are documented in sections 5.1
and 5.2.
2.4 Document Reviews
Periodically, MDSSC-KSC was requested to provide
launch and landing inputs to documents such as
plans, requirements documents, and operations con-
cept documents.
One document was the Planet Surface Systems Op-
erations and Logistics Concept document (JSC-
24824). It defines the planetary surface operations
concept and is the first of a series of documents to
be developed concurrently with Space Exploration
Initiative mission scenarios. The scenarios reflect
how the various mission elements and supporting
infrastructure will be operationally integrated and
used to accomplish all requirements associated with
assigned missions to a planetary surface.
During the LTFOS option 1 period, the Planetary
Surface Systems office was tasked to respond to the
release of the MASE surface architecture by deriv-
ing preliminary manifests, mass estimates, surface
system program development schedules, and capabil-
ity comparisons for each of the architectures.
MDSSC-KSC supported this effort by providing the
appropriate launch and landing inputs and general
review comments.
A description of this activity and the results are con-
tained in section 6.0.
2.5 Presentation of Study Results
During the study, progress presentations were given
to NASA-KSC CP and to the PSS office at JSC.
The annual review presentation is contained in
Appendix A.
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3.0 Analyses and Quick Lgok Assessments
This section of the report documents the ap-
proaches, results, and conclusions of the analyses
and quick look assessments that were conducted
during the Option 1 period of the Lunar Transporta-
tion, Facilities and Operations Study.
All analyses and quick look assessments that were
conducted under the Option 1 period were per-
formed under the assumption that the surface archi-
tecture would be Reference Architecture Option
5A. Option 5A is a deviation to Reference Architec-
ture option E which was developed under the
NASA 90 Day Study, but emphasizes In-Situ Re-
source Utilization (ISRU). Option 5 reduces the
scale of lunar outpost activity by using a human-
tended mode of operation and limiting the flight
rate to the Moon to one mission per year.
Option 5A adds a lunar oxygen production capability
of five tons per year to the Option 5. This rate is
sufficient for the LEV ascent needs in view of the
one flight per year rate. The emplacement phase
and early consolidation phase and are basically iden-
tical to the baseline Option 5. Changes between Op-
tions 5 and 5A become evident with flight 10 in the
later part of the consolidation phase, where a cargo
flight to deliver power, mining, and Lunar Liquid
Oxygen (LLOX) elements has been inserted. Due to
space basing of the LEVS, there is a resulting five
metric ton increase in cargo capacity of landers.
A summary of the activities leading to the emplace-
ment, consolidation, and operational phases of the
Option 5A approach are illustrated as a schedule in
Figure 3-1.
3.1 Lunar EJecta Analysis
The lunar surface is covered by a very f'me dust, be-
ing compared to abrasive talcum powder, and has
characteristics which causes it to adhere very tena-
ciously to surfaces such as EVA suits and spacecraft
surfaces. Apollo 12 landed 160 meters from the Sur-
veyor lit, which had landed on the moon two and
one-haft years earlier. The engine exhaust plume
from the Apollo 12 lander caused the lunar dust to
be propelled radially outward from the landing site.
The Apollo mission included the return of a number
of samples obtained from the Surveyor [] space-
craft. Among the samples retrieved were the TV
camera and a 19.7 crn length of a polished aluminum
tube. The tube was cut from one of the radar anten-
na support struts, but the exact position and orienta-
tion is unknown. Analysis of these samples showed
that the Surveyor III did receive damage from mi-
crometeoroid and/or ejecta impacts. Data regarding
the analysis of particle impacts on these samples are
documented in the report "Results of the Surveyor
III Sample Impact Examination Conducted at the
Manned Spacecraft Center _ dated 30 March 1971.
3.1.1 Ejects Analysis Paper Search
To project possible ejecta damage, MDSSC-KSC
used an ejecta analysis model developed by Eagle
Engineering, Inc. The model was based on data, de-
tailed above. A paper search was conducted to ob-
tain additional data.
3.1.1.1 Interaction of Highly Under-expanded
Jets with Simulated Lunar Surfaces. The source
for this data was "Interaction of Highly Under-ex-
panded Jets with Simulated Lunar Surfaces," NASA
TN D-1095, LeRC, December 1961.
This paper documents testing which used a super-
sonic wind tunnel (Mo - 3.5 at 300 psia) to achieve
test pressures of approximately one psia on a 40 inch
diameter base. Cold air at 2,000 psia was exhausted
through the sting to various engine nozzle configura-
tions with data collected at various distances from,
and approach conditions to, the simulated lunar sur-
face (a flat plate).
Throat and exit diameters were 0.5 and 2.5 inches,
respectively for a 25:1 area ratio. A cluster of four
nozzles with mass flow equivalent to a single nozzle
(throat diameters of 0.25 inches each) was also
tested.
Base pressures were measured on the thrust center-
line and radially along four axes at four throat diam-
eter (2 inch) intervals. Schlieren photographs (shad-
ow graphs) were also taken.
The results of the test show that surface pressure
distributions were dependent on: nozzle area ratio
(exit area/throat areas), nozzle contour (some con-
tours caused annular surface pressure variations,
which resulted from shock waves that originated
within the nozzle), and height from the surface.
Maximum pressure increased from 0.4 percent of
chamber pressure at 40 throat diameters (8 exit di-
ameters) to 6 percent of chamber pressure at 13
throat diameters 0.6 exit diameters). High surface
pressure was generally contained within 16 throat
diameters (3.2 exit diameters).
3.1.1.2 Plane Sectlon of Exhaust Row Reld of
a Jet. The source for this information is "Exper-
imental Investigation of Jet Impingement on Sur-
faces of Fine Particles in a Vacuum" NASA TN
D-2633, LaRC, February 1965.
The test on which the paper was based measured the
time history of crater growth and near field visibility
as a result of impingement from a single supersonic
(Mach 3.36) cold gas nozzle perpendicular to a dust
bed located in a 60 foot diameter vacuum sphere
(starting at 0.3 millitorr, which increased after two
tests to 1.0 miUitorr).
V'mibility through one side and both sides of the de-
bris cloud was measured using collimated light
beams and photo cells. Soil density versus time was
recorded by X-ray exposure of f'dm rotating past a
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slot beneath the soil bed. High-bed motion picture
and sequence camera coverage were alsoused.
From thissource,itwas found thatthe exhaustjet
willmost likelyexitthe engine inan under-ex-
panded condition,and willexpand and plume out-
ward ata ve[y largeangle with respectto the jetaxis
as defined by the "jet boundary" as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3-2. Under these high expansions, and for a
single engine, no oblique or transverse shock waves
should be formed.
Just above the surface, a bowl-shaped "normal
shock wave" will be formed, which will turn the flow
radially outward, as indicated by the "streamline."
A stagnation condition will exist where the nozzle
centerline intersects the surface. The resulting
"free-'stream dynamic pressure" will peak near a
point directly beneath the nozzle lip, and decrease
rapidly as radial distance from the stagnation point
increases.
The flow just above the surface will accelerate ra-
dially from the stagnation point, reaching a super-
sonic speed ("sonic line") while continually decreas-
ing in density.
Maximum surface shearing stress will likely occur at
the point of ma_mum dynamic pressure. This ex-
plains the occurrence of initial erosion in an annular
ring and the formation of central peaks. With time
the erosion should extend from this annular ring
both inwardly and outwardly.
The report states that "The ejection velocities may
be high and it is theoretically possible for the eroded
particles to reach lunar orbital conditions."
The experiment data confirmed the existence of an
incipient erosion boundary based on particle size.
Craters formed at a lower nozzle height tended to
have a greater depth-to-diameter ratio than those
formed at a greater nozzle height. Erosion rate in-
creased by a factor of 120 when nozzle height was
decreased from 10 to 5 nozzle radii.
Outside crater wails may be at angles greater than
the static angle of repose of the material, being sup-
ported by the exhaust pressure field, with inward
collapse occurring when the nozzle flow ceases. With
larger particles, which permitted the soil to
"breathe," this collapse was a slumping action. How-
ever, with one micron particles, it appeared that gas,
forced into the dust in the stagnation region, expan-
ded explosively at flow cutoff, destroying the crater
structure.
3.1.1.3 Close-Range Rocket Exhaust Impinge-
ment on Surfaces. The source for this data was
Experimental Investigation of Close-Range Rocket-
Exhaust Impingement on Surfaces in a Vacuum,
NASA TN D-5895, LaRC, July 1970.
The test on which this paper reports used an Apollo
Lunar Module (LM) attitude control engine with a
simulated LM base structure to fire at flat, dished,
and particulate surfaces under near-vacuum condi-
tions. Target surface impingement pressures and
heating rates, descent stage base pressures, and
nozzle static pressures were measured with the en-
gine at different thrust levels and at various altitudes
from and attitudes to the surface.
For firings normal to a flat surface, surface pressures
were distributed symmetrically across the surface,
and for altitudes down to about one nozzle diameter,
were highest at the nozzle centedine, peaking at a
pressure of about 0.043 times chamber pressure at
an altitude of two nozzle diameters. Below two
nozzle diameters, maximum pressure began to de-
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Figure 3-2 Plane Section of Exhaust Flow Field of Jet
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crease and shift to a point below the nozzle edge. At
an altitude of one nozzle diameter and in an area
directly beneath the nozzle it was relatively constant
at 0.024 times chamber pressure. At altitudes below
one nozzle diameter, peak pressure was under the
nozzle edge, increasing to 0.029 times chamber pres-
sure at an altitude of 0.28 nozzle diameter (just prior
to reaching choked flow).
During 0.1 second engine firings, vacuum chamber
increased from 0.4 millitorr to 1.3 millitorr (the lu-
nar surface is 1.0 millitorr).
The testing generated results which showed that
space vehicle base pressures were one to two orders
of magnitude less than the target-surface pressures,
and were measurable only at altitudes less than two
rocket exit diart/eters.
The onset of nozzle choking occurred when the cy-
lindrical escape area, formed between the rocket exit
and the target surface, became less than the rocket
exit area (i.e., an altitude of 0.25 rocket exit diame-
ters). The effect of nozzle choking is a significant
increase in nozzle static pressures compared with
unchoked values.
Surface heating increased with chamber pressure
and decreasing altitude. The maximum heating rate
occurred directly under the nozzle edge.
Firings off-normal to the surface increased both the
pressures and heating with increasing tilt. The
changes were within about 10 percent for angles of
eight degrees or less and altitudes down to one
nozzle diameter. At an altitude of 0.5 nozzle diame-
ter, uphill pressure under the nozzle edge increased
to about 0.056 times chamber pressure at four de-
grees tilt, and to 0.108 times chamber pressure at
eight degrees tilt.
Firing into a concave dish had little effect on pres-
sure levels, but the shift of the pressure peak from
the centerline to nozzle edge tended to occur at a
higher altitude (about 1.7 nozzle diameters).
3.1.1.4 Conclusions of the Exhaust EJecta Pa-
per Search. Surface pressures probably achieved
during landings of the Apollo Lunar Module were
estimated from test data that indicated peak pres-
sure of 4.3 percent chamber pressure should have
been achieved at an altitude of 2 nozzle exit diame-
ters. For the 59 inch LM descent engine nozzle, op-
erating at reduced thrust at a chamber pressure of
104 psia, yielded a maximum surface pressure of
about 4.5 psia at a LM altitude of about 3 meters. At
engine cutoff and an altitude of 1.3 meters, surface
pressure was an estimated 2.5 psia under the nozzle
edge.
A single RL10-3-3A engine, with a nozzle exit diam-
eter of 39.5 inches and operating at a liftoff chamber
pressure of 465 psia (16,500 lbs thrust), would pro-
duce at an altitude of about two meters, peak sur-
face pressure of approximately 20 psia, over four
times the surface pressure produced by the LM. Ad-
vanced engines, operating at higher chamber pres-
sures, would result in even higher surface pressures.
A cluster of four RL10s would have an equivalent
single-engine nozzle exit diameter of 79 inches. This
should raise the altitude of maximum pressure to
about four meters. However, depending on engine
spacing, shock waves resulting from interaction of
the four engine exhaust jets, would probably spread
the pressure over a broader area, with a correspond-
ing reduction in peak pressure.
One protective measure would be to compact the
soil in the pad area to increase the cohesive forces
that resist erosion of fine particles.
Another measure would be to pave the pad area
with stones of sufficient mass to resist the aerody-
namic erosion force. Surface static pressure dropped
precipitously at one nozzle diameter from the center
of thrust, and pavement much beyond this point
should not be necessary (three to four meters be-
yond the landing Critical Error of Probability).
3.1.2 EJecta Analysis Approach
A computer model was developed by Eagle Engi-
neering, Inc. to define ejecta caused by the engine
blast of a vehicle landing or launching from the sur-
face. The model required three pieces of informa-
tion; the engine thrust, the height of the nozzle
above the lunar surface, and distances from the en-
gine centerline. The outputs from the model in-
cluded the velocity at which the particle impacts a
target (in meters per second), the particle impact
crater that the propelled particle could cause in alu-
minum and bullet resistant glass (crater size in milli-
meters), the percentage of the target's surface which
is pitted by the particles in the blast plume, and par-
ticle density.
The program is based on Prandtl-Meyer expansion
equations which provide a method of determining
the gas velocity, flow angle, and shock angles at vari-
ous points in a pressure field. (The Lunar Blast Pro-
gram user guide and code is contained in Appendix
B.) The Prandtl-Meyer expansion equations provide
a method of determining the gas velocity, flow angle,
and shock angles at various points in the pressure
field. These equations depended upon the type of
gas being analyzed; they were developed for a sea-
level atmosphere. It is assumed that the gasses com-
ing out of the lander engine have the same proper-
ties as a standard atmosphere. This assumption is
made primarily because the gas constant for the pro-
pellant is unknown. Since the 1 atmosphere specific
heat ratio (gamma) for the engine exhaust is not sig-
nificantly different from a standard atmosphere, 1.3
vs 1.4, this assumption should not be in great error.
The problem is that the vacuum environment causes
gas ratification. The effects of ratification of the
Prandtl-Meyer model are unknown.
MDSSC used this program to determine the effects
of small particle eiecta for a range of engine thrust
levels from 15,000 to 80,000 Ibf. Engine nozzle
height was held to 1.0 meter because the minimum
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nozzle heights varied between 1.0 and 128 in the
Transfer Vehicle Concepts and Requirements Study,
Interim Reviews. Target distances were varied from
between 50 meters to 15 kilometers. The model was
also used to examine large particle trajectories with
the same input parameters. See "l_ble 3-1 for a list-
ing of the input parameters.
Table 3-1 EJecta Analysis Input Parameters
Single Engine 15.000 Ibf 1 meter 50 M to 15 KM
20.000 Ibf
................................
Two Engines 30°000 Ibf 1 met_ 50 M to 15 KM
40,000 Ibf
o o_.... ...........................
Three Engines 45.000 Ibf 1 meter 50 M to 15 KM
60,000 I1_
Four Engines 60,000 Ibf 1 meter 50 M to 15 Kid
80.000 lbf
Location of the crew habitat with respect to the
launch and landing area was also considered. The
habitat must be close enough to the launch and
landing area such that transportation time between
the two is not excessive, and yet far enough away to
preclude the possibility of damage from engine ejec-
ta. Surface Support Equipment (SSE) must be close
to the pads to reduce the length of interconnecting
fluid lines and electrical cables. For these reasons
MDSSC examined the range between 50 meters and
15 kilometers.
TWo basic types of damage from ejecta were ad-
dressed, sandblasting caused by small particles (i.e.,
1 mm or less in diameter), and dents or punctures
caused by large particle impact (particles greater
than lmm in diameter).
Soil samples taken on the Apollo 11 mission were ana-
lyzed to determine soil particle size distr_utions. It
was found that 90% of the soil is made up of particles
less than lmm in diameter. Figure 3-3 illustrates the
lunar soil grain size versusper Cent distribution.
3.1.3 Electa Analysis Results
This analysis showed that small particles (150 mi-
crometers) will pass above and beyond habitat and
ISRU areas, except particles propelled at low eleva-
tion angles (0.25 - 1.0 degrees). The impact velocity
of the small particles will vary according to the
thrust levels of the engines. A 15,000 lbf engine will
propel particles at velocities of up to 329 m/s, an
80,000 lbf engine will propel particles at a velocity of
966 m/s. However, these small particles have a ten-
dency to disperse rapidly with range and the density
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approacheszeroat4km when propelledby an
80,000Ibfengine.Aluminum pittingcausedbysmall
particlesdropsbelow I0% atIkm and glasspitting
from theseparticlesdropsbelow 10% below2.4krn.
The resultsoftheanalysisforlargeparticles(lmm
to10ram)indicatethatan 80,000Ibfenginewillpro-
pelImm particlestoimpactvelocitiesof370 m/s and
I0mm particlestoimpactvelocitiesof117m/s.Ifit
isassumed thattheparticlesaresentoutata maxi-
mum elevationangleof5 degrees,then1mm par-
tidescouldbe propelledasfaras 15krnand I0mm
particlescouldbe propelledasfaras 1.5km.
Accordingtopostmissionreportsand interviews
withMr. PeteConrad,Apollo12astronaut,surface
gasflowshorizontaltothesurface.These sources
alsoreportedthatthedustwhichwas displacedby
thelander,orbytheastronautswalkingon thesur-
face,had a tendencytostayrelativelyclosetothe
surface.Becausethereisno atmosphereupon which
thedustcan remainsuspended,thedustdidnotbil-
low up asitwas displaced.Therefore,afivedegree
maximum elevationwas assumed.
3.1.4 Conclusions of the EJecta Analysis
If Reference Architecture Option 5A is assumed and
a barrier is erected between the pad and the areas to
be protected (75 meters from the center of the pad),
the barrier would have to be 1.5 meters high to pro-
vide protection from the blast effects of small par-
ticles being propelled from the landing site. The pro-
tection could be erected from blast shields or from
surface regolith piled up as berms. The erection of
the berms, or blast shields, would also provide pro-
tection for tow prof'fle equipment (less that 1.5 me-
ters in height) from large particles as long as the
equipment was located from 75 to 375 meters from
the pad. The chart in Figure 3-4 illustrates the pro-
tection which could be provided by berms.
The use of a berra, 1.5 meters high, located 75 me-
ters from the center of the pad is intended to be
used as a point design. The berrn should be a 120
degree arc approximately 157 meters long, requiring
353 cubic meters of regolith, or 530 tonnes (assum-
ing 1.5 tonnes per cubic meter). Figure 3-5 illus-
trates this configuration. It may be poss_le to obtain
this much regolith during the pad preparation (i.e.,
leveling). It may require filling "sandbags" with rego-
lith and arranging the "sandbags" to form the berms.
A loose piling of regolith could actually contrfl)ute
to ejecta problems because the berm could act as a
ramp to propel loose particles on its surface.
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and Landing Site
During the course of the analysis, MDSSC-KSC was
requested by Planetary Surface Systems to consider
the effects of a vehicle landing 100 meters from the
berm (nominal being 75 meters). Because the engine
is throttled down during landing, this landing prof'de
was not Seen as a significant concern. For example,
during the Apollo 12 mission the LEM engine
throttle setting, under manual control, varied be-
tween 19% and 44% of maximum thrust from an
altitude of 1000 feet until landing. (See Altitude/
Range Profile in Figure 3-6)
However, during lift-off the throttle would probably
be set at 100% for maximum thrust. Figure 3-4
(page 3-6) shows projectile trajectories for an 80,000
lbf (355858 N) engine with the berra at 75 meters for
150 micrometer and 10 mm particles. At 100 meters
from the berm, 10 mm particles could strike the sur-
face at a range of 375 meters.
In discussing the Apollo 12 mission with Astronaut
Pete Conrad, he stated that dust movement was first
noted at an altitude of 175 feet (thrust level was be-
tween 1990 and 4400 lb0, and the Surveyor was cov-
ered completely with very f'me lunar dust to the
point where it was almost imposs_le to see it against
the lunar background after landing. At fhst they
thought that the structure was discolored from some
solar effect. The fact that it was coated as a result of
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engine blast ejecta was not determined until they
returned to earth with their samples.
While berms would provide protection from small
particle strikes, the berms would not protect against
large panicles strikes which would follow a ballistic
trajectory. Large particles could rise over the berm
and on the downward flight path strike surface
equipment and structures. The danger from this haz-
ard occurs from 375 meters out to 15 kin. However
the probability of large particle impact damage is
relatively low for two reasons. First, large particles
(1 to 10 ram) constitute less than 10 percent of the
lunar soft, thus reducing the probability of a large
particle being contained in the ejecta. Secondly,
these particles would be propelled at velocities
which are relatively low (117 to 340 m/s).
3.2 Thermal/Mlcrometeorold Protection
Trade Study
This analysis was originally performed under the
base study period of the Lunar Transportation Facili-
ties and Operations Study. Per the request of the
NASA-KSC Study Manager, Mr. J. R. Reiss, the
analysis was refined to evaluate the same protection
options using the PSS Reference Option 5A. After
that analysis was made, the PSS Office at JSC re-
quested MDSSC-KSC to evaluate the impacts of
making the Storage Facility Option mobile. Differ-
ences between the groundrules of this analysis and
the previous analysis are illustrated in Table 3-2.
3.2.1 Trade Study Approach
For this trade study, four options were analyzed.
One option, the Consolidated Vehicle Option, would
Table 3-2 Comparison of Baseline and
Option 5A Architecture Launch
and Landing Groundrules
_:iii!iiiiiiii:,_HiTECTURSi!iii::i::iii:-ii?:i::
Permanent Habitation Man-tended
.............................. . - .
Four Crew Members with Four Crew Mecrd=ers
Growth to Twenty
_ . o . . . ............................
Three Vehicles on the One Vehicle on _e
Surface Surface
More Than One Vehicle One Vehic_ _ Per Year
Flight Per Year
.................................
LLOXProductionPlant LLOXProductionRant
.... ..... o . .......... ... .........
Vehicles Based o_ Lunar Vehicles Based in LLO with
Surface with Excursions Excursions to Surface
toLLO
......... o .......................
Vehicles to be Replaced Vehicle Use Vart_ -
AfterF_teFlights NoMornThanFiveRighta
CargoVehicleswen) All_ Vehicles=I)
Reusable ExpendedonLunez
Surface
have the lander provide its own protection for both
the space flight and the surface stay time. This pro-
tection would be similar to the Apollo Lunar Mod-
ules (LM) which carried its own thermal protection.
The other three options are surface based protection
systems - the A-frame Tent, the Vehicle Skirt and
the Storage Facility. For this analysis it was assumed
that these systems would not be constructed of lunar
surface material, but would be part of the infrastruc-
ture that must be developed on earth and sent to
the lunar surface.
In space flight, a "Barbecue Mode" of heat rejection
is used in which the spacecraft is slowly rotated on
an axis perpendicular to the sun so that hardware
items which have accumulated heat can reject the
excess heat to deep space. Obviously, this approach
is not suitable for the lunar surface. The Consoli-
dated Vehicle Option, Figure 3--7, combines the re-
quired spaceflight protection with the required sur-
face protection into a single vehicle design. This
consolidation of the requirements into a single de-
sign provides protection for both environments.
However, even with adding this protection, the en-
gine nozzle will remain exposed to the thermal envi-
ronment through reflected energy from the surface.
The nozzles which are directly attached to the en-
pines and the propellant distrfl_ution system allow a
thermal short directly to the propellant tanks where
unacceptable heating may occur. It should be noted
that the landing pads of the vehicle will be in direct
contact with the surface and will also conduct heat
to the vehicle. However, protection against the con-
duction of heat through the pads was not considered
in this analysis.
The A-Frame Tent (Figure 3-8) uses two upright
poles, a ridge pole, blankets and guy wires to erect
protection for the vehicle at the landing site. To con-
struct the tent, one edge of the tent blanket would
be staked to the ground, the support would be at-
tached to two of the lander foot pads, and then the
assembly would be raised over the vehicle. As the
assembly is raised, the blanket would deploy along
guy wires. Once vertical, the remaining half of the
blanket would be deployed by lowering it along guy
Uso of Vohiclo
_0 0 \ Right Protection
to Provide
t'_ t'_ / Protection While
'_ "-' / on the Surface
'
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wires. Side flaps, which would be required to protect
against heat reflected by the surface, would deploy
automatically with the blankets.
Another surface-based option, the Vehicle Skirt Op-
tion (Figure 3-9), is similar to the Consolidated Ve-
hicle Option except that the required protection is
added to the vehicle after landing. Following land-
ing, crew egress, postlanding inspections and cargo
removal, the crew would be required to remove
blankets or "skirts" from storage and use access
equipment and handling fixtures to attach the blan-
ket to the manned module or cargo interface. The
flight vehicle would have provisions for attaching the
top edge of the protective blanket with the bottom
edge attached to the lander legs. Since the cargo
vehicles are expended on the lunar surface after a
single use (Reference Architecture Option 5A), the
cargo vehicles would not require protection. It
should be recognized that vehicles expended on the
lunar surface could be a source of spares for other
vehicles, but protection of expended vehicles was not
considered in this analysis.
Attachment
Ring
Thermal/
Micro-
metemld
Blanket
Bottom Edge
Attachment t(
Lander Legs
(4 places)
Figure 3-9 Vehicle Skirt
A final surface--based option is the Facility Storage
Option (Figure 3-10). This option has a feature that
the other options do not have. It can be expanded to
accommodate multiple launch and landing vehicles
and associated Sin-face Support Equipment (SSE). Fol-
lowing landing, the vehicle would be raised, wheel as-
semblies attached and then the vehide would be
towed to the storage facility. Hazardous consumables
could be ottloaded prior to facility entry if a propellant
storage area were provided. The facih'tywould be sized
to accommodate any number of vehicles and could
accommodate changes in the vehicle configuration.
Since the other surface based options are meant to
protect a single vehicle, this analysis used a single bay
storage facility. This permits an accurate comparison of
masses and EVA man-hours required to erect these
protection options.
Figure 3.10 One Bay Storage Facility
3.2.2 Evaluation of the Thermal/
Mlcrometeoroid Options
Three primary factors were used to determine the
relative merits of one lunar protection option over
another. The mass required to be placed on the lu-
nar surface was one criterion. This estimate included
the mass of the protection system, but did not in-
elude the mass of the propellant that would be re-
quired to transport the protective system to the lu-
nar surface.
Another evaluation criterion was the amount of time
(EVA man-hours) that would be required to erect
the protective system on the lunar surface. The esti-
mates for these timeframes are relative at best. The
estimates were made by determining which current
prelaunch and postlanding operations were similar
to the proposed operations and then making time
projections based upon experience. In some in-
stances existing KSC operations did not provide a
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credible comparison aircraft handling operations
were used for comparison purposes.
The final criterion used for this evaluation was the
operational characteristics of each of the options
under study. Included in this criterion are such fac-
tors as safety (mission, lander, crew, surface sys-
tems), operational complexity, and durability.
3.2.2.1 Mass to Surface. The results of the
mass-to-lunar comparisons are recorded in 1Yale 3-3.
As identified in this table, the least mass to the lunar
surface is provided by the Vehicle Skin Option. The
next lightest form of protection is the ConsoUdated
Vehicle Option. The heaviest protection was provided
by the Storage Facility Option with 7821 pouncl_ How-
ever, this assumes that the storage facility is a one-bay
configuration. The storage facility option has a greater
mass pay-back when it is expanded to accommodate
more than one vehicle. For instance, a three bay facil-
ity accommodates three vehicles with about twice the
mass. The mass calculations for each of the options
are contained in Appendix C.
When the operational characteristics of each of the
options is taken into account, a straight forward
comparison of the masses of each of the options may
be misleading. The material used to provide surface
protection will deteriorate from continued exposure
to intense ultraviolet radiation. This causes the ma-
terial to become brittle which would become a prob-
lem if the fabric is folded or unfolded repeatedly.
The A-Frame and the Vehicle Skirt would call for
Table 3-3 Mass of the Surface Protection
Options
. .c_____,_ veh_, op_ 2.42sI_ (_ch n_h_
............................
A-FrameOption 6.342 11:)6.(total)
VehicleSkirtOption
........ 1.g15,oe. manned (totaJ)
........................
Storage FacilityOption 7,821 Ilos.(1 bay)
the repeated folding and unfolding of the protection
material; therefore, the A-Frame Tent and the Ve-
hicle Skin would have mass penalties from material
replacement requirements.
If it is assumed that the fabric would have to be re-
placed after five flights, then the mass advantage of
the Vehicle Skirt diminishes. At one flight per year,
this five year life is probably optimistic. After four
replacements, the facility option would become the
lightest surface protection. The Consolidated Ve-
hicle Option carries its protective system on the ve-
hicle, therefore, the mass associated with this option
accumulates with each flight. The Consolidated Ve-
hicle Option becomes the least desirable from a
mass standpoint after just three flights. The graph in
Figure 3--11 illustrates the resulting material re-
placement impacts. Based on these considerations
the Storage Facility Option was considered to have
the greatest mass to surface advantage.
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3.2.2.2 Operational Considerations. As dis-
cussed in section3.2.2 estimates for EVA Man-Houri
are based on comparative earth bound tasks. Based on
this methodology, flow charts for the tasks to establish
surface protection were generated and the required
times to erect each of the protection options were esti-
mated. (The flowcharts of these tasks and the esti-
mated times for each of the tasks are documented in
Appendix D.) _Lble 3-4 documents the total times
required for each of the options.
Since the Consolidated Vehicle Option brings its
protection with it to the surface, it requires no erec-
tion time. Excluding the Consolidated Option, the
table illustrates that the A-Frame Tent has the low-
est single erection time. However, The A-Frame
Tent and the Vehicle Skirt Option require repeated
deployment for manned vehicles.
The Storage Facility Option, on the other hand, re-
quires a the preparation of a site and the erection of
the facility itself, which is a one-time event. The
recurring portion, 13:50, is preparing the vehicle and
transporting it to the facility.
Based on the operational considerations the Consol-
idated Vehicle Option is the preferred option fol-
lowed by the Storage Facility, A-Frame Tent, and
Vehicle Skirt options.
3.2.2.3 Summary of Results. The consolidated
Vehicle Option offers advantages in that the surface
operational complexities are minimized. Providing
protection by using vehicle systems eliminates the
need for additional prelaunch/postlanding opera-
tions and associated EVA. Another advantage is that
the vehicle does not need to be moved. However,
the disadvantage of this approach is that there is a
cumulative mass penalty. Another disadvantage is
the thermal short from the hot lunar surface to the
propellant through the engines and propellant lines.
The Consolidated Vehicle Option, while simplifying
operational complexities, imposes a great mass pen-
Table 3-4 EVA Manhours for Each Protection
Option
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_! ____i_!___E _____E ___: ::: ;i:= __!:_:i:iiii_i!i!_ili:i_i:_i:_i.i:i:i_:i!i:_:_;!:_:_:_!_i:i_i_i_i_i_: :!:i: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Conl_ldatlKIVehicle NotApplicable
A-Freme 17:40(recurring)
Preps& blanketInstallation& removal
...................... 9 ..........
VehicleSldrt 21:20(recurring)
Preps& blanketinstallation& removal
...................... o ...........
StorageFacility 18:30(1bay-
Sitepreps&facilityerection non-ncurdng)
Preps& flightvel'dcle_ans_ 13:50(mct_)
to/frompad/Coragefac,,y
alty without providing optimum protection and is not
considered a desirable option for multiple missions.
There are two distinct advantages to the A-Frame
Tent Option. One advantage is that it offloads mass
from the vehicle. Another is that the vehicle does
not have to be moved to a storage site. The disad-
vantage of this system is that the protective system
must be moved to the landing site. This entails the
use of equipment or surface transportation vehicles
and also adds to the complexity of the surface opera-
tions. This adds to the amount of EVA. The blanket
material itself would have to be replaced because
repeated erections and lowering after exposure to
intense ultraviolet radiation degrades the material.
There is also the potential for damage to the lander
and surface support systems if the A-Frame or its
blanket is dropped onto the lander.
Like the A-Frame Tent, the Vehicle Skirt Option
off-loads mass from the vehicle and does not re-
quire the moving of the vehicle to a storage site.
However, it adds greatly to operational complexity
including the moving of the protective system to the
landing site. This concept is dependent upon surface
support equipment for access, lifting, and handling.
It requires a great amount of EVA support. There is
also a potential for damage to the lander and/or in-
jury to the crew members from mishandling the skirt
or handling equipment. The material itself is subject
to damage from repeated deployment that must oc-
cur on every flight and would require replacement.
The Storage Facility Option offioads mass from the
vehicle. Also, the characteristics of the facility pro-
vides several advantages. It can be expanded to ac-
commodate several vehicles, which increases the
operational efficiencles for multiple vehicle flows.
However, placing multiple vehicles within a single
facility exposes all of the vehicles to any catastrophic
event. The facility can also provide protection for
Surface Support Equipment and for astronauts
working on the vehicles. This option also has the
distinct advantage that material degradation will not
occur through repeated handling and deployment.
The major disadvantage to the Storage Facility Op-
tion is that it requires the moving of the vehicle to
the storage facility, which adds to the complexity of
prelaunch and/or postlanding operations.
3.2.2.4 Conclusions of the Thermal/Micro-
meteoroid Study. The comparative results of each
of the options (Consolidated Vehicle, A-Frame, Ve-
hicle Skirt, and Storage Fadlity options) are shown in
"llfl31e3--5. Based on these considerations, the Storage
Facility Option appears to be the best current choice.
3.2.3 Mobility Anab/sls of the Storage Facility
Option
The Storage Facility Option was originally evaluated as
a stationary surface protection system. However, the
PSS Office requested MDSSC-KSC to determine if
there were any potential benefits associated with using
a mobile facility. Therefore, MDSSC-KSC conducted
a quick assessment of making the facility mobile. Two
areas were addressed. First, this concept was evaluated
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Table 3-5 Summary Comparison of the Protection Options
OOngofldaINKI _ Most Most InadequabD
Vehicle Option Desind_ Desirable Desirable
.............................................................................
A-Frame Tent Less Less Less Adequam
Option Desirable Desirable Desirable
Vehlcle Sldrt Most Least Least Adequato
Option Desirable Desirable Desirable
............ . _. ............. °. ...............................................
Storage Facility More More More Adequa_
Optlon Desirable D_ir_le
to determine if the facility would need any ack:litioual
stiffening of its structure. This stiffening would impose
a mass penalty. Secondly, this concept was evaluated
to determine if there would be any changes associated
with the EVA time required to for a mobile versus a
fixed protection facility.
A NASA Structural Analysis (N_) model
was created by MDSSC-KSC Mechanical and Facili-
ties Engineering to analyze the loads that might be
encountered in the facility structure ff it were
mounted on wheels on each comer. The loads that
were evaluated included the lunar gravity, the loads
of the material being supported on the Storage Fa-
cility frame, and the loads which would be imparted
to the structure due to the torque of the drive units.
The three configurations that were evaluate are:
1. Fully closed on four sides
2. Partially opened (bottom front horizontal stabilizer
removed)
3. Fully opened (bottom front horizontal stabilizer
and diagonal guy wires removed to provide full
frontal opening for positioning around item to be
stored)
The model assumed construction with the horizontal
connected so that they can transmit torques
and moments. It was assmned that theupright col-
umns would be deployable masts and they take only
axial load_ The model was constrained to simulate
one wheel off the ground for each facility conir_n_ra-
tion. This effectively supports the structure by two op-
posite comers allowing it to deflect as much as it can.
For the fully closed configuration, the facility de-
flected 2 inches. For the partially opened configura-
tion deflection was 30 inches, and the deflection was
excessive for the fully opened configuration. (A de-
flection of 24 inches could be tolerated.) The NAS-
TRAN model indicates that the facility is structurally
sound and should weigh 7821 lbs.
Wheel loading for the facility drive units was briefly
studied. Engineering assumptions were based on
extrapolations of data found in a report titled "Lu-
nar Surface Transportation Systems conceptual De-
sign" which was prepared by Eagle Engineering, Inc.
This study estimates that four 60 inch diameter wheels
12inches wide could support the facility while exerting
a contact pressureof 1.2 _ (The maximum that the
lunar regolith can support is 1.4psi.) The wheel would
_ak about Z5 inches.
The size of the wheel would probably dictate that
mounting of the drive units would have to be to the
side. Additional NASTRAN runs were made and
verified that this would not have much of an effect
on the structure's weight. Extrapolating weight data
from the Eagle report indicates that the wheel as-
semblies would add another 330 Ibs to make the fa-
cility mobile. The total weight of a mobile facility
would be about 8151 pounds.
There would be a savings in EVA time. If the facility
were mobile, there would be no need to attach jacks
and raise the lander, attach wheel assemblies to the
lander, and attach a tow bar to the vehicle. Deleting
these three activities saves about four hours in EVA
time. Total EVA time to move the facility to the
landing site and provide protection for the vehicle
would be about nine hours and 50 minutes.
3.3 Centaur Prelaunch Procedure Analysis
For this study, the prevailing thought was that the Lu-
nar Excu_n Vehicle would use liquid oxygen and
hydrogen for propellants and expander cycle engines in
the 15,000to 20,000Ibf thrust range.The only engine
in the United States inventory that uses liquid hydro-
gen and oxygen and an expander cycle is the RL-10
engine, which is used on the Centaur. Therefore, the
Centaur offers an e_mple of the type of prelaunch
procedures that might be employed with a liquid hy-
drogen-oxygen lunar lander. This lead to the Centaur
prelaunch procedure analysis.
3.3.1 Analysis Approach
The approach was to identify each one of the proce-
dures which are used to ready the Centaur for launch.
Each procedure was then evaluated to determine the
tasks performed, resourr.es required, and time neces-
sat3, to run the procedure. The applicability of each
procedure to LEV/MEV operations was assessed and
relevant data was recorded in a data base.
In each data base record there are nine fields as
follows:
• Sequence number (Data base entry number)
• Title
I
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• Procedure (Centaur procedure number)
• Description (Description of the procedure)
• Remarks
• Resources .......
• Schedule Data
• Recommendations
• Rationale
Figure 3-12 shows a sample record.
3.3.2 Analysis Results
Forty-eight test procedures were analyzed and 28
appear to have some degree of applicability to the
LEV/MEV. The flow of these procedures is illus-
trate d in Figure 3-13 Appendix E is a printout of the
data base.
3.3.3 Analysis Conclusions
Analysis of the Centaur prelaunch test flow has
identified several tests that must be added to the
planned LEV turnaround flow, which was prepared
during the original study period. One general con-
clusion that can be drawn is that there are many pro-
cedures which are necessary to maintain existing
engine designs and that any engine which will see
repeated use in a non-terrestrial environment
should be designed specifically to minimize hands-
on servicing.
3.4 MDSSC-KSC Support to MASE
Trade Studies
During the Option 1 period of the LTFOS, Mission
Analysis and System Engineering conducted several
trade studies which required inputs from the func-
tional areas of the Planetary Surface Systems Office.
This section descrgoes the support that MDSSC-
KSC provided to the PSS Office in meeting these
assignments.
3.4.1 Precursor Engineering Data Needs
High resolution information and detailed soil and
atmospheric data are available for the Apollo lunar
landing sites, and to a lesser degree for V'ddng mar-
tian landing sites. A higher level of detail is required
for the preliminary design phase of the equipment
development program and is required eight to ten
years before launch.
The approach to defining the required data was to
consider launch and landing operations in the lunar
and martian environments and identify those param-
eters that must be known to ensure that adequate
equipment development and program planning can
J
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
[ CTP: CCLS VAUDATiON
Old CTP No:
Description
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power []
TotalPm_)nnel ]
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Deto 05/22/89 Shifts
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
CCLS-5000 New CTP No: CCLS-0001
Verifies properoperationof thecomputercontrolledlaunchset interfaces (groundequipment,
computer,pedphendsand digitalcommunicationlandlines)throughthe use of tenant
validatJortprograms.
Run priorto vehiclesupport
Vehl©lePower [] Pneumatics [] CCLS []
. : Engr _ Tech 1 IMp 1 Safety
S Serial Operation [] Parallel Operation []
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain [] Reduce [] Delete []
Rationale: Runa much shorterversionfor PSScomputer_.
Figure 3-12 Sample Record of the Centaur Procedure Analysis Database
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Figure 3-13 Centaur Test Flow
occur. A rationale for each required parameter and
the system impacted by the parameter were also
identified. A listing of the required data is contained
in Appendix E
3.4.2 Reference Architecture Option 5A
Landing Assessment
The two purposes of this assignment were to 1) iden-
t/fythelaunchand landingtasks,theirdurations,and
theresourceutilizationntermsofSSE and machine
time,and 2)determinewhichofthelaunchand land-
ingtaskswouldbe candidatesforroboticapplications.
The outputsofthisassessmentwere I)a Un-naround
scenarioforReferenceArchitectureOption5A,2)a
task--duration-machineusematrix,and 3)a listing
of launch and landing tasks which are candidates for
robotics.
3.4.2.1 Assessment Approach. The major in-
put to making this assessment was the Reference
Architecture Description Option 5a (Option 5 with
ISRU Emphasis), PSS Reference Architecture Doc-
ument 90-2.
In the Reference Architecture Option 5A, the lunar
base would not become permanently manned. The
first human return to the moon would occur in 2004.
Its man-tended crew of four would have one flight
per year for one-to-twelve month tours of duty. The
LEV would be stored in low lunar orbit between
missions. A lunar LLOX demonstration is planned
for 2011, but there will be no lunar liquid oxygen
produced for export to Space Station Freedom
(SSF). A LLOX production plant would become
available in 2012. A direct mission to the lunar far
side would be conducted in 2022. This option also
features a simulated Mars mission starting in 2013
with a crew surface stay time of 600 days. Since a
base crew would not be available, the launch and
_ I
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landing operations will have to be performed by the
flight crew or the procedures automated, or done
telerobotically. The profile for the missions that
would be carried out under a Reference Architec-
ture Option 5A is summarized in Appendix G.
To derive the launch and landing turnaround scenar-
io for Option 5A several assumptions were made.
These are:
• Only planetary surface launch and landing opera-
tions are considered.
• The surface base is man-tended and not perma-
nently inhabited
• EVA operations require two surface crewmen and
one Intravehicular Activity (IVA) person for support
• Cargo vehicles are expended on the planetary sur-
face, with the exception of the first cargo vehicle
(LEV-C0) which is returned to the Space Station
Freedom for engineering analysis
• Expendable manned vehicles are expended in space
Based on these assumptions and the baseline turna-
round flow developed under the base study period,
an Option 5A Launch and Landing Turnaround Sce-
nario for the LEV was developed. (See Appendix
H.) Once the turnaround scenario for Option 5A
was developed, estimates of the task durations could
be made. These estimates were based on the pre-
vious estimates made for the baseline turnaround
flow. Like the baseline turnaround flow, the times
shown in the matrix are Earth equivalent times and
do not compensate for inherent EVA inefficiencies
or transmission delays associated with telerobotic
operations. Also, no attempt has been made to iden-
tify the potential for parallel operations since crew
size limitations may not permit them. The time esti-
mates for the tasks associated with the manned and
unmanned vehicles are contained in Appendix I.
Based on KSC experience, each launch and landing
task which may require SSE was identified. (See Ap-
pendix I.) Since Reference Architecture Option 5A
does not dedicate a surface crew to launch and land-
hag operations, there are limitations as to what the
crew will be available to do. When a task was found
to be a candidate for robotic applications, it was
identified and it is noted in Appendix I.
3.4.2.2 Results. Ten major activities, including
eighty-two launch and landing tasks were identified.
Fourteen types of SSE were identified that may have
some application to lunar launch and landing opera-
tions under Reference Architecture Option 5A. To-
tal time durations to accomplish this activity is slight-
ly over 52 hours. Of these tasks, the large majority
was identified as having a potential for robotics, tele-
robotics and/or automation applications.
3.4.2.3 Conclusions. When compared to other
lunar launch and landing operation approaches, Ref-
erence Architecture Option 5A does not significant-
ly differ in the tasks, amount of activity, and time
and SSE requirements.
A_IAI_mLL D_&IIGM._I_
3.4.3 Expendable vs Reusable Vehicle 0uick
Look Assessment
MDSSC-KSC was requested to conduct a quick look
assessment to determine which of the Reference Ar-
chitecture Option 5A launch and landing tasks would
be applicable to expendable and reusable vehicles.
The turnaround scenario, developed by MDSSC-
KSC was used in this assessment. Generally speak-
ing, manned vehicles were considered to be reus-
able. Because cargo vehicles are to be expended on
the surface after a single use, they were considered
to be expendable. Each vehicle was then compared
to the turnaround scenario to determine the applica-
bility of each of the launch and landing tasks identi-
fied in that scenario.
A task to vehicle applicability matrix is contained in
Appendix J. Both the expendable and reusable ve-
hicles would require tasks associated with landing
and cargo removal. However, the reusable vehicle
would require additional tasks associated with mat-
ing SSE interfaces, transporting crew members to
habitats, post-landing inspections, thermal blanket
installations, vehicle maintenance (if required), blan-
ket removal and external closeout, launch prepara-
tions, and launch.
As the study team expected, using expendable ve-
hicles greatly reduces the launch and landing opera-
tions. However, there are other activities that may
be undertaken if expended vehicles were on the sur-
face. These would include cannibalization of fluids
and parts for reusable vehicles or other surface sys-
tems, offloading tanksets for fuel storage, and using
the vehicle thermal protection for surface systems.
Although these other activities are valid consider-
ations, detailed evaluations will have to wait until
the surface architecture and operations concepts are
better defined.
Recognizing that there are other considerations
which should be made, a recommendation to use
expendable vehicles would be premature. The sav-
ings of IVA and EVA time should be traded against
additional vehicles and associated vehicle processing
at orbital and earth nodes.
3.5 Storable Propellant Quick Look
Assessment
The objective of this quick look assessment was to
determine the considerations that should be made if
storable propellants were to be used instead of liq-
uid oxygen and hydrogen.
3.5.1 Approach
The approach to this analysis was to evaluate the lu-
rer/martian environment, compare two options for
storing propellants against the environmental consider-
ations, and identify appropriate design to criteria for
SSE using KSC-SID-7_A_A, Standard for Design of
Hypergolic Propellants GSE, as a reference.
It was assumed that the storable propellants must be
maintained in their liquid state at 15 psia. As can be
seen in Figure 3--14, at this pressure, significant
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Figure 3-14 Thermal Considerations for Five Different Storable Propellants
thermal conditioning will be required by planeta_
SSE. Heating and cooling will be required on the
moon, and heating will be required on Mars to
maintain the liquid state throughout the local day-
night cycle.
The capabilities of SSE are driven by which approach
is taken for storing propellants. For Option 1, it was
assumed that there would be no handling of storable
propellants on the planetaxy surface, and the SSE
would be required to monitor the propellant pressure
and temperature, thermally condition the propellant,
and capture and contain any propellant overflow due
to such things as high temperature expansion or de-
composition. Option 2 assumes that SSE would be
used for all of Option 1 requirements and be used to
transfer and scavenge propellants and top-off LEV/
MEV tanks. Table 3-6 identifies the required capabi.-
ties for each of the storage options.
The design requirements for KSC hypergolic propel-
[ant GSE contained in KSC-STD-Z-0006A were
then summarized and projected to the lunar and
Mars surface environments to obtain a summary of
PSS storage propellant SSE design requirements.
3.5.2 Resulta
The results of this assessment are summarized in
Tables 3-7 and 3--8. Table 3-7 summarizes the re-
quirements for equipment in general and Table 3-8
summarizes the requirements for mobile equipment.
Table 3-6 Required SSE Capabilities for Two Propellant Handlln_l Options
!i!ii iTiiiiiiiiii     i   ! iiiiii!ii!ii!iiii!ii
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Mo_itn¢ Ta_k Prossure_ & Tempomturo_ • • •
Propellant Temperature _ • • •
Capture OverSow (_ o_ DecompoedUo_) • • •
Transfer Prol:_lards (Auxil_r'y to FSght T_nks) N/A • •
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Table 3-7 Comparison of SSE General Design Requirements for KSC, the Moon, and Mars
Humid Corrosive
Atmosphere
1G
Dry,Dusty
No Atmosphere
1/6 G
!ii@  si iiiiiiiiiii!ijii!
Dry.Du=y
Minimum Atmosphere
I/3G
Corro61onProtection Salt Air Dry Dry
Design Life 20 Yrs. 30+ Yre, 30+ Ym.
More Severe
Doubff_
R_htWeight
1/6G, No Atn'_
1/6 G, No Atmosphere
No Area Deluge
N/A
No Atmosphere
No Purges
No Permanent Facility
Severe
Required
"Boiler Code"
Earth Environment
Earth Environment
0.5 GPM Deluge
Protection Required
KSC-STD-E-0002
Environmental Regs.
Wdhin ControlledArea
Safety Requirements
Vapor DetecOon
Safety Factor
Or_erattng Pressure
Quantity vs. Distance
Fire Protection
Ughtnlng
Hazard Proofing
Vapor Disposal
Conneclions
More Savere
Possible
RehtW=ght
1/3 G. Min. Atmosphere
1/3 G, Mln, Atmosphere
No Area Deluge
N/A
Inert Atmosphere
Purges TBO (CO2)
No Pern'uanerttFacility
Ecological Considerations Earth Impact Lunar Impact Mars Impact
Human Engineering SCAPE Operations EVA OperaJions EVA Operat_ns
Reliability KM1-1710.1 (Probably More Strict)
MateriaJs
Cleaning
Pickling
Passivation
Welding
Per 7gK11948 KSC-C-123
Level 300/300A
KSC-SPE C-Z-0(X)3/0016
TBD
TBD
TBD
(May Not Be
Bonding & Grounding KSC-STD-0012 TBD
TBD
_ed a ViableOperation)
-._j'
When comparing requirements for SSE against
GSE, safety requirements are one category of signif-
icant differences. These are largely related to re-
duced gravity, the non-availability of water, and no
significant atmosphere (Mars' surface atmosphere is
95 per cent carbon dioxide and the pressure is equiv-
alent to Earth's at 100,000 feet altitude or 1/100 the
surface pressure at Earth). Other considerations in-
dude operations in EVA suits versus Self Contained
Atmosphere Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits at
KSC and the very dry conditions and low conductiv-
ity of lunar soil which may cause severe buildup of
static electricity.
For mobile equipment, hose material will have to
contend with intense ultraviolet radiation, near vac-
uum conditions, and severe contamination. Lubri-
cants will be exposed to near vacuum and. severe
temperature extremes and will have to be specially
formulated to preclude off-gassing of volatiles and a
loss of function. The near vacuum environment will
preclude the use of bubble solutions as a leak detec-
tion method. More frequent cleaning of filters may
be required because of the dust environments, but
these same conditions could make the task much
more difficult to accomplish without introducing
contamination into the system. Ullage space in pres-
sure vessels should probably be increased because of
the temperature extremes that could be encountered
in the event of an Environmental Control System
(ECS) failure. Because of near vacuum conditions,
wind loading is of no consequence. (See Table 3-8.)
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Table 3-8 Comparlson of Mobile Support Equipment Deslgn Requlrements for KSC, the Moon,
and Mars
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Portable Equipment
Hoses
Material
Service Life
Full Inspection
Restraints
Permeability
Valves
Seal Material
Operation
Lubdcants
Leak Tests
Filters
Type
Cleaning
Leak Test Medium
OSHA Weight Limits
SCAPE Suits
PolytetraJluoroethylene
w/Stalnlese Steel Wire Wrap
2 Yrs.
Prior to Use or Yearly
Anchors Req'd > 150 psig
Through Inner Liner OK
No Metal-to-Metal Seats
Pneumatic Preffered
Krytox 240 AC
Tribolube 16. Types I & III
Tdbolube 10, Type I11
Bubble w/10% He Mixture
Mass Spectrometer
Tee Type Preferred
Perk_k_h/
He Gas
ASME Boiler Code
Addit_ 1/16" Thickness
10%
Pressure Vessels & Supports
Corrosion Allowance
Ullage
Wind Load Allowance 2 pcJg
1/6 G cr'BD)
EVA Suits
UV & Vacuum CompatC_le
(,Sameas KSC)
1/3G ('rBD)
EVA Suits
UV&VacuumCompatible
(Same as KSC)
TBD TBD
Electrical Preferred
(Exposure to Lunar/Mars Atmosphere & Temperature
Extrernes Must Be Considered in the Design)
MassSpectro Me= Spectro
Tee Type Preferred Tee Type Preferred
TBD TBD
TBD TBD
Right Weight Right Weight
Right Weight Flight Weight
(More Because, Temperature Ex_ Must be Considered)
None Required No Consequence
v
3.5.3 Conclusions
The results of the assessmentshowedthat the use of
storable propellants will not eliminate the need for
surface operations and related SSE. If the propel-
lants are to be maintained in a liquid state and ve-
hicle tank pressures are to remain within a reason-
able range, thermal conditioning of the LEV/MEV
will be required, as a minimum.
L=_
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4.0 Logistics Support
DuringtheOptionIPeriodtwologisticstaskswere • EVA overheadtime(i.e.,suitup,teardown,transi-
undertaken. One task was an analysis to provide an tion to work site) was not considered in the main-
early look at the effort required to support an LEV
Servicer on the surface. The second task involved pro-
viding support to the PSS Logistics Functional Area
Manager who was integrating data from all functional
areas into the System Design Utility Model.
4.1 LEV Servicer Maintenance Analysis
The objective of this analysis on the LEV Servicer was
two-fold. First, it was to demonstrate how early logis-
tics involvement during the conceptual phase of a pro-
gram can be effectively employed. This is very impor-
tam since ninety percent of the support decisions are
made prior to any hardware fabrication. The second
objective, was to influence the conceptual design of
the LEV servicer towards a more supportable system.
The purpose was also two-fold. First, to select or
develop a comparative system that represents char-
acteristics of the LEV servicer for projecting sup-
portability requirements, making judgements con-
cerning feasibility of the LEV servicer support
requirements, and identifying targets for improve-
ment. And second, to determine supportability, cost,
and readiness drivers of the LEV servicer.
The approach used to conduct this analysis was a
tailored MIL-STD-1388-1A "Comparative Analysis
Task 203" approach. The first step was to select a
candidate system for analysis; in this case the LEV
servicer. Then develop, if not already available, a
maintenance concept for the servicer. Next, develop
ground rules and assumptions necessary to define
the system and operation. Then applying the mainte-
nance concept, develop functional flow diagrams to
identify the operations and support tasks that must
be performed. Then utilizing these data, select a
functionally similar existing system for comparison.
From the flows, compare the new systems tasks and
support requirements withthe existing systems tasks
and support requirements and extrapolate the sup-
port requirements where necessary. Then conduct
an assessment to determine the key support drivers
and develop design recommendations. The detailed
analysis is provided in Appendix L
The greatest benefit of this approach is that it quick-
ly reduces new design concepts to a quantitative
measurement enabling early feasibility judgements
and identification of key drivers. This allows the de-
sign function to focus on these significant drivers
during the conceptual phase. This approach also en-
ables management to focus its design efforts where
there is the highest potential for improvement.
The groundrules and assumptions utilized in this
study are as foilows:
• The LEV servicer will operate continuously for
one year
• No attempt was made to factor for the differences
between SSF and lunar operating environments
tenance hours
• Limited life items were not included in this analysis
• The following sourr_ documenta/data were utilized:
• PSS Elements Data Base for 90 Day Lunar/Mars
Study(1/90)
• PSS Operations and Logistics concept, ILS Sec-
tion (6/90)
• Lunar Lander Propellant Liquefaction System
Study (9/89)
• External Maintenance Task Team (i.e., Fisher-
Price) Report (7/90)
• Space Station Freedom Preliminary Design Data
The comparison systems selected from the Space Sta-
tion Freedom are shown in "Ihble 4-1. The SSF sys-
tems were selected because of the desire to apply the
latest technology and the availability of comparison
data.
After extrapolating the servicer systems support re-
quirements from the SSFP systems, the results indi-
cated the LEV servicer will incur approximately 46
failures per year;,will require approximately 60 hours
of EVA maintenance time per year, and will require
43 spares per year. The key support drivers are the
reliquefaction system as well as the computer and
communications systems. Together, these systems
represent 81 per cent of the total servicer failures.
In addition, the analysis revealed the maintenance
tasks will be conducted on hazardous systems there-
by mandating, special access, leak detection, and
cleaning equipment.
Of note, the Fisher Price Report dated July 1990
estimates that the number of SSFP electrical power
system failures will range between 93 and 153, ther-
mal control system between 0 and 7, ECLSS be-
tween 21 and 50, and communication system failures
between 127 and 262. For an overall estimate of be-
tween 241 and 472 failures per year. This coupled
with the fact that no factoring for operating environ-
ment, EVA overhead, or limited life item replace-
ment was included, tends to lead one to believe the
Table 4-1 LEV Servicer Systems Compadson
Supp_system PowerSystem
................................
ThermalRejection/ Them_ Contl_System
System
P_k:lUefactlonSystem ECLS_
PowerSystom +.
................. - ........ o .....
Computer/ DataManagementand
CommunicationSystem ComrnunioationSystem
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LEV Servicer estimates are low and the actual fig-
ures will end up being much higher than indicated.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis are(l) al-
ternatives to the use of reliquefaction or an increase
in the reliquefaction systems reliability are necessary
to reduce the number of failures, (2) an increase in
the reliquefaction systems maintainability are re-
quired to reduce the overall maintenance times, and
(3) the computer and communications systems reli-
ability needs to be increased to reduce number of
failures.
4.2 Planet Surface System Logistics Modeling
Support
Another area of support provided by MDSSC-KSC to
the PSS Logistics Manager at Johnson Space Center
was in the develOpment of initial design cost inputs on
the LEV Servicer to help test the System Design Util-
ity (SDLO and the Equipment Design Cost Analysis
(EDCAS) models. These models were being evaluated
for standardization of the PSS logistics modeling effort
and for use in determining logistic support impacts on
system design and life cycle cost.
Each NASA functional area manager was tasked to
provide the data required for the $DU model input
fields. MDSSC-KSC, in support to the Launch and
Landing functional area manager, used the compara-
tive analysis on the LEV Servicer to derive the data.
Comparative data were extrapolated from the Space
Station Freedom preliminary design and the Space-
lab program. The cost data were derived through the
use of cost estimating relationships.
The results Appendix L indicated that the LEV Ser-
vicer would cost approximately nine million dollars,
and once deployed, would require thirty-five hours
of scheduled maintenance per year. (This is in addi-
tion to the unscheduled maintenance.) The specific
inputs are provided in Appendix L. It is very impor-
tant to remember these data are preliminary and
were based upon a conceptual design. As the design
matures, these data will also change accordingly.
V
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5.0 Advanced Development Planning
MDSSC-KSC participated in two areas of advanced
development planning. One area was to determine
the types of test beds that would be required to sup-
port an advanced development program for PSS
hardware. Another advanced development planning
effort was undertaken to determine the require-
ments for technology which needed advanced devel-
opment to support timely delivery of the required
lunar/Mars launch and landing systems.
5.1 Test Bed Development Planning
From the PSS perspective advanced development is
the transfer of technology into an approved flight
project. For example, this will require the develop-
ment of several subsystems such as thermal, reactor,
and conversion subsystems for a power system. Con-
cepts and operations will have to be developed
through the use of models, mockups, and testbeds.
Therefore, there vras a need to define the types of
testbeds, models and mockups that would be re-
quired for PSS developments.
Table 5-1 Test Applications of an Advanced
Development Environmental Test
Chamber
• Demonstrate active ar¢l passive thermal control under
p_tary condmons
• Demonstrate the detec_on/isolalorVcontzol of
out-of-tolerant condi_ons under planetary
environmental conditions
• EvaJuatethe use of humans, automation, robotics,
and telerobot_cs (HART) for vehicle repair
• Test fluid b'ansfer, oonclil_onlng,reliquefactJon, and
gauging techniques
• Test cryogenic storage and handling concepts
The PSS Office managed this effort by requiring
each of the functional areas to respond to a series of
action items, each action item building upon the pre-
ceding. The first step was to develop a functional
area hierarchy. For the launch and landing area the
functional area system breakdown included two
areas - the LEV and the SSE required to support
the LEV. Each of these areas were descried in gen-
eral terms. Figure 5--1, shown on next page, illus-
trates the Launch and Landing Functional system
breakdown.
The launch and landing analysis for advanced devel-
opment found that an environmental chamber could
be used to support several advanced development
tests and/or demonstrations. Table 5-1 lists these
test applications.
Once the functional area was broken down, PSS re-
quired a description of the advanced development
test beds that would be required to demonstrate or
make a proof of concept for the hardware areas that
required new technologies. Supporting information
as to why the test bed was required was provided.
After the test beds were defined, the last action item
was to estimate when the test beds would be re-
quired by determining when the technology would
be needed by the functional area.
The schedule for this activity is illustrated in Figure
5-2. Note that on the schedule are milestones which
x...J
94 95 96 97 98
0 1 2 3 4
I I I I
Thermal ConUol : :::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::?:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: !i:! :iii i::!ii :i: ::i
con_ol Health/ it %!i::i:-i:-i::!+I::?:I
Monll_rlno /..
Vehiole R_dd L _ ::::::::i:+i?:i:iiiiii
Mlcromewrldd
ProtectIon
Maintenance/Checkout
InspeclSon
Fluid Transfer
Surface
Equipment
99 00 01 02 03 94 05 06 07 08
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
i
CAD ,, Complete Advanced Development
Figure 5-2 Schedule of Test Bed Acthttty for Launch end Landing Advanced Development
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ample, the test activity associated with development
of thermal control begins in 1994 and ends in 2000
which is six years. The technology begins with a tech-
nology readiness of 3 and ends with a technology
readiness of 5. The technology readiness levels are
defined in Table 5-2. Note that in the example men-
tioned above, the technology would progress from
analytical and experimental to component and/or
breadboard demonstrations.
5.2 Identification of PSS Advanced
Development Tasks, Schedule and
Provide Manpower Estimates
The objective of this support was to provide launch
and landing inputs to the PSS Advanced Planning
Effort. As a functional area of PSS, the launch and
landing area was tasked with determining the re-
Table 5-2 Technology Readiness Levels
Level1
Level2
Level3
Level4
Level5
Level6
Level7
Level8
Level9
Level 10
Level 11
Level12
Bas_principlesobservedandreported
Technologyconceptimcl/or_oplic.alon
formulated
_& experimental_ function/
stlcproofofconcept
Componentand/_ breadboardvaJida_oninlab
Componentancl/(x"breadboardemoin
relevantenvironment
SystemvaJiclalJonmodeldornoin
s=mulatedenvironment
SystemvaJkJaJJonmodeldemoinspace
Minorityofdrawingsexist
Roughlyhalfofdrawingsexist
Majorityofdrawingsexist
Predominantumbe¢ofdrawingsexist
Virtually100%ofdrawingsexist
quifements for technology and advanced develop
ment to support timely delivery of the required lu-
nar/Mars launch and landing systems. Inputs
required the generation of a Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) and manpower estimates.
Using the mission profile (Appendix G), a WBS was
developed. The WBS is contained in Appendix M.
Based on the WBS and the schedule for develop
ment of the launch and landing system, manpower
estimates were was generated. The manpower esti-
mates are contained on task description sheets which
descnbe the WBS task. The task description sheets
and the schedule are contained in Appendix N.
5.3 PSS Launch and Landing Requirements
Generation
Another advanced development planning activity
was the development of launch and landing require-
ments. The requirements were generated by review-
ing the study and analysis work performed over the
last year (both in support of the PSS office and
NASA-KSC) and identifying those items which
would become requirements for a lunar/Mars mis-
sion.
The objective was not to identify detailed design re-
quirements (-L,evel IN or IV'), but to identify broad
system requirements (Level If). If this work is not
undertaken there is a risk of missed opportunities to
plan and execute advanced development programs in
a timely manner.
Appendix O is a description of the studies and analy-
ses that will be required to derive adequate require-
ments for lunar surface launch and landing opera-
tions. Each page descr2)es the launch and landing
advanced development requirement, its rationale, a
description of the task associated with the develop
ment requirements (future work), and the risks asso-
dated with not pursuing the future work.
W $-3
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6.0 Document and Concept Reviews
Throughout the course of the study, MDSSC-KSC
was requested to provide inputsand review comments
to several SEI Documents. The documents were the
MASE Architecture Documents, PSS Architecture
Implementation Strategy documents, and the PSS Op-
erations and Logistics Concepts Document.
6.1 Review of the MASE Architectural Themes
.During the Option 1 period of LTFOS Mission Analy-
sis and System Engineering (MASE) developed five
approaches to surface architectures. These were the
Exploration Emphasis, Expanding Human Presence,
Aggressive Mars, Modified Reference (later renamed
as the Evolution Emphasis), and the Energy Enter-
prise. Of these MDSSC-KSC was tasked with review-
ing the Exploration, Expanding Human Presence, and
the Evolution Emphasis Architectures. Comments to
these documents were submitted through the PSS
Launch and Landing Functional Area Manager.
6.2 Review of the PSS Architecture
Implementation Strategies
The objective of this review was to compare the PSS
Implementation Strategies to the MASE Architec-
tures. The PSS Imple_ entation Strategies were to
complement the MASt. Architectures. It should be
pointed out that the Research Emphasis Architec-
ture of PSS responds to the Modified Reference
(also called the Evolution Emphasis). Appendix P
provides a comparison of the characterizations of
each of three MASE architectures reviewed and
compares the PSS Implementation Strategies to
these characterizations.
6.3 Review of the Planet Surface Systems
Operations and Logistics Concept
Document
This document is intended to be one of a set of doc-
uments for the operations of the Planet Surface Sys-
tems (PSS) for both Lunar and Mars Exploration.
The set also includes PSS Operations Plans, Re-
quirements, Rules, Data File, Activity Ground Rules
and Constraints, and Program Objectives. The pur-
pose of this document is to capture the basic ideas
which form the foundation for the subsequent docu-
ments. MDSSC-KSC was requested to provide in-
puts for the launch and landing section of this docu-
ment and provide review comments on all of the
sections. MDSSC-KSC's and NASA-KSC's com-
ments and inputs were submitted through the PSS
Launch and Landing Functional Area Manager and
incorporated into the first draft copy of this docu-
ment. The document was released as JSC-24824.
Since this document has been released and portrays
a synthesized operations concept, this report will not
replicate the inputs of that document.
V F
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7.0 Conclusions of the LTFOS Option 1 Study
The greater part of this year's study effort was spent
supporting the development and definition of con-
cepts and reference architectures, and conducting
analyses and quick look assessments.
7.1 Conclusions of Analyses and Quick Look
Assessments
The lunar ejecta analysis indicates that protection
for a lunar base would be required either in the
form of berms or paving or both. However, the re-
sults obtained from the computer-based model are
preliminary and are based on soil samples taken
from Apollo and damage assessments made avail-
able from samples taken from the Surveyor III
spacecraft during the Apollo 12 landing. This only
provides a single data point. Precursor missions may
be required to obtain data which would provide a
greater confidence level. This precursor requirement
was provided to the MASE trade studies.
The thermal/micrometeoroid protection trade study
resulted in broad conclusions. Vehicle based-protec-
tion has a mass penalty associated with it, while sur-
face-based protection requires an increase in surface
operations to provide the required protection. A
surface based option which does not require assem-
bly or disassembly tends to be the best compromise.
Making such an option mobile was one of the objec-
tives of this year's analyses. This approach tended to
make the surface based option more attractive.
The analysis of the Centaur prelaunch operations
procedures has identified several RL-10 engine tests
that should be considered for an LEV. One general
conclusion that can be drawn is that there are many
procedures which are necessary to maintain existing
engine designs and that any engine which will see
repeated use in a non-terrestrial environment
should be designed specifically to minimize hands-
on servicing.
A quick look assessment to evaluate using hypergolic
propellants instead of liquid hydrogen and oxygen
was conducted. The assessment, which was limited
to SSE considerations, indicates that the use of stor-
able propellants will not eliminate the need for sur-
face operations and related SSE. If the propellants
are to be maintained in a liquid state and vehicle
tank pressures are to remain within a reasonable
range, thermal conditioning of the LEV/MEV will
be required, as a minimum.
7.2 Conclusions of Logistics Support Tasks
Several conclusions can be drawn from an LEV Ser-
vicer Maintenance Analysis. The current thought is
that the LEV would require reliquefaction to conserve
fuel which may bog off from the vehicle. However, the
analysis indicates that alternatives to the use of reli-
quefaction or an increase in the reliability of a relique-
faction system are necessary to reduce the number of
failures. The reliqudaction system, if used, must be
designed with maintainability goals in mind. Based on
the analysis results, the reliquefaction system could
expect as many as 19 failures per year. In a similar
fashion, the computer/communications system could
expect as many as 18 failures per year and must have
maintainability designed into the system.
7.3 Conclusions Regarding Reference
Architecture Option SA
Evaluation of the Reference Architecture Option
5A from a launch and landing perspective indicates
that the reference architecture has relatively little
impact on the type or nature of launch and landing
tasks that must occur. The vehicle must still be
landed, safed, cargo unloaded (if applicable), serv-
iced, maintained, readied for launch and launched.
However, the features of this reference architecture
has an impact on vehicle design. The vehicle must
be designed with greater autonomy in mind with re-
gards to testing and servicing. The LEV is strictly a
transportation vehicle and as such provides a service.
As with any service, it must be reliable, available,
and affordable.
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Appendix A
Presentation
of the
Lunar Transportation Facilities Operations Study,
Option !
Annual Report
L/
Appendix A
Presentafioa of the LTFOS Option 1 Annual Report
Thisappendixcontainsthe vugraphsandfacingl_.ge materialsprovidedforthe studyfinal
presentation.Itprovidesa summary,inpresentationformat,oftheaccomplishmentsand
conclusionsdrawn duringthepastyear.
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Appendix B
Lunar Blast Program
This appendix contains a description of the Lunar Blast Program. The program was developed by
Eagle Engineering, Inc. to assist MDSSC-KSC in conducting its lunar blast ejecta analysis. The
attached document describes the theory and assumptions on which the lunar blast program is
based. The blast program code is also attached as an appendix to the program theory and
• description.
\j
Lunar
BLAST
Program
Pmpan_ for McOonradlDouglasSpaceSystans Co.
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BLAST Theory and Asstjmpti_o_ns
The BLAST program is intended to be a "quick-look" predictor of damage due to lunar
ejecta from launch and landing events at a future lunar base.
The basis for the progam is the calculation of the exhaust plume flowfield from the
vehicle motor. This calculation is made utilizing the Prandti-Meyer expansion equa-
tions. These equations provide a method of determining the gas velocity, flow angle,
and shock angles at various points in the pressure field. These equations depended
upon the type of gas being analyzed; they were developed for a sea-level atmosphere.
It is assumed that the gases coming out of the lander engine have the same properties
as a standard atmosphere. This assumption is made primarily because the gas
constant for the propellant is unknown. Future literature searches may provide a
value, and hence a more accurate solution. Since the one atmosphere specific heat
ratio (gamma) for the engine exhaust is not significantly different from a standard
atmosphere, 1.3 vs 1.4, this assumption should not be in great error. The problem is
that the vacuum environment causes gas rarif'K:ation. The effects of ratification on the
PrandtI-Meyer model are unknown.
The engine model is that of a Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) descent engine. It is a
pressure fed, monomethyl-hydrozene/nitrogen-tetroxide {MMH and NzO4, respec-
tively), radlatlvelly cooled engine. The coefficients used for calculating the throat gas
density and total temperature are based upon MMH.
The gas flow is blocked and redirected bythe presence ofthe lunar surface. Prandtl-
Meyer theory for a gas leaving the exit surface of a rocket nozzle makes no allowances
for gas flow redirection due to external blockages. To account for this problem, a
pseudcexit surface is envisioned. The pseudoexit Su_is a the Vertical cylinder
below the nozzle. It has a dlarneler equal to that of the nozzle exit, and a ienglh which
is equal to the nozzle height. This surface is the gas exit surface which is used in the
PrandtI-Meyer model. This also requires that the model be modified for the radial
expansion effects of the circular exit surface.
in order to calibrate the model to _ the Surveyor damage estimates, the Initial position
of the particle Is chosen to be 17.1 nozzle exit radii from the nozzle centerline. The
damage is more sensil_veto the particle's in_al pos_ion than the obsc_ ration factor.
There IS a particle "spreading effect" which occurs as the lander approaches the lunar
surface. The smaller particles are moved first, when the lander is high. As the lander
gets closer to the ground, progressively larger particles are moved, and the smaller
particles which have already been moved are pushed farther from the landing site.
For the Apollo 11 landing site, a comparison of the particulate size versus percent (by
weight) of the lunar regoilth is shown in Rgure 1.
The BLAST model selects six particulate sizes representing the most damaging to
objects far from the landing site. Damage is estimated using artillery models
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developedbytheArmy.A weighted average ofthe effects of each particle size is used
to calculate total damage. The particle sizes and their corresponding weights are
shown in F_ure 2.
One of the ultimate goals of this activity is to determine the mean particle size as a
function distance from the lander. This is a landing trajectory problem which is
presently not b-eated in this model.
The particle's position and velocity are Integrated until the gas density is less than
.(XX)01 Ibs/ft 3. Prandti-Meyer theory expects the gas to expand to some static atmos-
pheric pressure. The extreme case in which the gas is expanded to a vacuum is not
modelled well under this theory. The gas density tends to asymptotically approach a
lower limit which is not zero. To handle for this problem, the gas density is adjusted
with a correction factor (cf). The correction factor is a weighted function of distance
from the nozzle, ffthe particle is close tothe ( <10 nozzle radii ), then the cf is inversely
proportional to the ratio of the distance. Beyond 10 nozzle radll, it is Inversely
proportional to the ratio of the square of the distance. This means that the gas Is
expanded radially when it is near the nozzle, and as a source flow when it is far from
the nozzle.
A one dimensional integration of the horizontal velocity is performed. The maximum
distance the pafdcle may _avel can be approximated by completing a ballistic analysis
of a 45* lob using the horizontal velocity.
The astronauts commented that lunar dust had obscured visibility dudng the landing
process. Apollo 15 reported dust movement at an altitude of 45 m. Total obscuration
was normal at the time of landing. The "obscuration factor" is the pdmary method by
which BLAST defines the particle flux. This factor is selected to be 50%.
The obscuratlon is defined to be the loss of visibility through a cubic 1 me'aerof dust. It
should be noted that the astronauts were reporting obscuration of the lunar surface.
These obscuratlon reports are depend upon the thickness of the dust cloud, or - if the
lander is in the dust cloud - the height of the lander. Therefore, 100% obscuration
simply means that the astronaut could not recognize the surface. The altitude of the
lander or the thickness of the dust cloud must be known at the instant in which "100%
obscured" Is first mpodsd In order to accurately calculate the particle flux. However,
the astronauts did not report the first observance of "100% obscured =. it must also be
understood that recognition and seeing are not the same_An astm .r.'_u,_t may be abr_d_
see the surface; but since he can not recognize it, he will report 100% obscu .
Obdously there are many problems wi_ using obscuration asthe defining parameter
forflux. Unfortunately, it lathe only parameter thatwe have.
The flux reduces at a rate proportional tothe square ofthe distance from the point at
which it Is measured. It is assumed that the obscuration measurement is made at a
location which is 5 meters from the nozzJe center line.
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Descent profile for Lunar Lander Blast Program
BLAST is equipped with a tyajectory of an Apollo lander, if so desired by the user. The
following descdptlon covers the lessons of the Apollo flights regarding ejecta as well
as tt_e_ajectory Itself.
Apollos 12 and 15 reported total obscuraUon during the descent. Apollo 15 observed
dust movement at 45 m above the surface, and reported total loss of visibility at 18 m.
This was nottt_e general case, however. Apollo 14 observed that the dust was a sheet
less than 6" deep moving along the surface; and though which, surface features were
always visible. Apollo 11 transcripts Indicate file appearance of a "faint shadow" Just
prior to landing. Apollos 16 and 17, which descended more rapidly, reported first dust
movement at altitudes much lower then the previous lunar missions. In Apollo 17, the
dust never totally obscured the view of the surface, but was seen to be moving when
the lander was at 15 m. Table 1 gives an overview of the dust observations for the
various Apollo missions.
Table 1" Apollo Dust Reports
Apollo 11 Location:
Du_
Descent:
South Plain of the Sea of Tranquility
"Kickingup some dust" 30 It
"Faint shadow" Landing
2to3 fVs
Ap01=|6;I-2 Loca_n:
Du_
Descent:
Ap0._11o_14" _tl0n:
So_Jff_e_ast Plain of the Sea of Storms
Dust Movement 175 It
Totally Obscured 50 It
2to 61t/s
Descer¢
=
Fra Mauro Highlands
North ofthe Seaof Clouds
DustMo_ment is"sbee_ 110It
Never Totally Occurred
3ff/s
Apo_o 15 ii Local: Hadley Rg_tl/ePlaln
Soub_-east _on of the Sea of Rains
(Apennlne Mountain)
Du_ Rrst Dust 130it
Totally Obscured 60 It
Apollo 18 Loca_n:
Du_
Descent
Descartes Highlands
Mountains West of the Seaof Nectar
Rrst Dust 50It
Never Totally Obscured
11to5ff/s
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Apollo 17 Location:
Du_
Taurus-LJttrow Valley
South-eastern Edge of the Sea of Serenity
DustMovement 50 It
NeverTotallyObscured
The amount of dust and blown pa_cles is heavily dependent upon the location. It is
possible that descent rate could also be a key factor, but the connection is not obvious.
Ifthe number of particles is dependent upon location, Itis logical to conclude that the
blast damage is also location dependent Thismeans that future modifications tothe
lunar blast model should have some technique for adjus_ng the bed dynarnics for
different soil characteristics.
Figure 3 is a graphical Illustration of the vertical descent profiles for Apollos 14, 15,
and 17. Apollo 17 appears to have a median _ajecb:x3/. "Therefore,the Apollo 17
_'ajectory has been sel_ to be the baseline descent t_'ajectoryfor the Lunar Blast
Model.
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Figure 3: VerUcal Descent Profiles
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The chosen trajectory is detailed in Table 1.
Table 1 - Altitude versus Time for Apollo 17 Descent
Time <s> _ AIt <m>
0 0
5 5
10 8
15 10
2O 12
25 14
30 15
35 19
4O 21
45 23
5O 25
55 29
6O 33
65 41
7O 52
V
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APPENDIX A
Lunar Trajectory Data
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BLAST Program Listing
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I000 DIM C(3, I01),nut(4,360)
I010 'Constanhs
lO2O oi - 4 * ATN(1)
I030 DTIME-.001
1040 ROL - 1600
1070 GL - 1.62
1080 CD - 4
1090 OBS-.5
II00 PD - .00015
1120 BD = 5
1130 CLS
"lime Step <s>
"Soil Density <kg/m" 3>
"Lunar O <m/s 2>
"Coefficientof Drag
'ObscuringFactor
'ParticleDiameter <m>
'BlastDuration <s>
1135 '
1140 "Createthe Mach ParametersTable Odlachvs Turning Ang, Math Aug,
Area RaU.o)
1145'
1150 FOR i = 1 TO 300
1155 mch-l+lll00
1160' Calculate the turn/rig angle for Std. air
1165 nu - (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (math " 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mach " 2 -
z) ".5)) * 180/pi
1170 mu - ATN(I / (math - 2- 1) " .5) * 180/pi
1175 Aet-((l+.2*mach'2)/1.2) 3/roach
I 180 nut(l, i) - roach
1185 nut(2, i) - nu
1190 nut(3, i) - mu
1195 nut(4, i) - Aet
1200 NEXTi
1205 FOR i = I TO 30
1210 math-4 + i/I0
1215' Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1220 nu - (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach " 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mach " 2 -
1) .5))* 180/pt
1225 mu-ATN(l/(mach 2- 1)'.5)* 180/pi
1230 Aet-((l+.2*mach'2)/l.2) 3/roach
1235 nut(l, 300 + i) - roach
1240 nut(2, 300 + i) - nu
1245 nut(3, 300 + i) - mu
1250 nut(4, 300 + t) - Act
1255 NEXT i
1260 FOR i " I TO 6
1265 roach - 7 + 1/2
1270" Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1275 nu - (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach " 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mach " 2 -
l) " .5)) * 180/pi
1280 me - ATN(I /(roach"2 - I) " .5_* 180/pl
1285 Aet .-((I÷ .2 * roach" 2)/ 1.2) 3/roach
1290 nut(I,330 ÷ i)- roach
1295 nut(2,330 ÷ i)- nu
1300 nut(3,330 ÷ i)- mu
1310 nut(4,330 + i)- Act
1315 NEXTi
1320 FORi-ITOI0
1325 mach-10+i
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1330" Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1335 ne = (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mach " 2 -
1)" .5)) * 180/pi
1340 me - ATN(I / (roach " 2 - 1) " .52 * 180 ! pi
1350 Aet-((l+.2*mch'2) ll.2) 31roach
1355 nut(I, 336 +i) - inch
1360 nut(2, 336 + i) = nu
1365 nnt(3, 336 + i) - mu
1370 nut(4, 336 + i) - Act
1375 NEXTi
1380 FORi=ITO6
1385 mach-20+5*i
1390" Calculate the turning angle for Std.. air
1395 nu = (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mch " 2 -
l) " .5)) * 180 1 pi
1400 me - ATN(I/(num.,h" 2- 1) " .5)* 180/pi
1405 Aet = ((1 + .2 * inch " 2) / 1.2) 3 1 roach
1410 nut(l, 346 + i) = roach
1415 nut(2, 346 + i) -"ne
1420 nut(3, 346 + i) - mu
1425 net(4, 346 + i) - Aet
1430 NEXT i
1435 FORi=ITO5
1440 mach=50+10*i
1445" Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1450 nu., (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach 2 - I)) " .5) - ATN((mch " 2 -
1) " .5)) * 180 [ pi
1452 mu - ATN(I [ (roach " 2 - 1) " .5_ * 180 / pi
1454 Aet-((l+.2*mch'2)/l.2) 3/roach
1456 net(l, 352 + 1) - roach
1458 nut(2, 352 + i) - nu
1460 nut(3, 352 + i) - mu
1462 nut(4, 352 + i) - Aet
1464 NEXT 1
1466 mch- 1000
1468 'Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1470 nu = (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach - 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mach " 2 -
1) " .5)) * 180 Ipl
1472 au = ATN(I/(Inch " 2 - I)) * 180 Ipi
1474 Act - ((1 ÷ .2 * math " 2) / 1.2) " 3 / inch
1476 nut(l, 358) = roach
1478 nut(2, 358) - nu
1480 nut(3, 358) - mu
1482 net(4, 358) - Act
1484 inch .- I0000
1486 "Calculate the turning angle for Std. air
1488 nu - (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roach " 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mch " 2 -
1) " .5)) * 180 lid
1490 mu - ATN(I I (roach " 2 - l) " ._ * lS01 pi
1492 Act- ((l + .2 * roach " 2)I 1.2) 3/roach
1494 net(l, 359) - m_ch
1496 net(2, 359) - nn
1498 net(3, 359) - me
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1500 nut(4,359) - Aet
1502 math - 100000 ............
1504 "Calculatethe turningangleforStd.air
1506 nu - (2.45* ATN((.167 *(mach "2 - I))" .5)- ATN((mach "2 -
1)" .5)) * 180/_
1508 mu - ATN(I /(roach" 2 - I) " .5_* 180 /pl
1510 Aet-((l+.2*mach'2)/1.2) 3/roach
1512 nut(l,360) - roach
1514 nut(2,360) - nu
1516 nut(3,360) - mu
1518 nut(4,360) - Aet
1520 _User Inputs
1530 INPUT "Engine Thrust <n> - "; TR
1540 INPUT "Nozzle Height <m> - ";NH
1550 INPUT "Object'sDistancefrom the Landing Site<m>- ";DLS
1560 thrat - TR/4.4482 Whrust (lbs)
1570 isp - 302 'Specific impulse
1580 ER - 43 "Expansion Ratio
1590 p0 = 102 * 144 'Chamber Premmre - 102 palm
1600 tO - 5350 "Chamber Temp. -- H204/MMH (R)
1610 RC = 53.3 'Gas Constant (Std. Air)
1620 dens0 " p0 / RC I t0 _tt D_ _ 3P_X+(lb/ft" 3)1630 den_- .63394 * dens0
1640 wdot - thrat / Imp
1650 tt - .83611 * tO
1660 mat - (1.4 * RC * 32.174 * tt)
1670 At - wdot / dens0 / mat
1680 re - (At * ER / pi) " .5
1690 Aea - 2 * pi * re * NH * .3048
1700 "
1710 'Determine the Imeudoexit surface roach number, If the area of the
exit
1720 'surface is leas than the throat area, then the exit surface roach
number
1730 'is 1. 1.000001 is used to prevent mathematical division errors.
1740 '
1750 re©hem- 1.000001
1760 IF Ace [ At • 1 THEN 1800
1770 lgORi- ITO359
1780 IF Acre / At > nut(4, 1) THEN mchea - (nut(I, l + 1) - nut(l, i)) /
(nut(4, l ÷ 1) - (nut(4, 1)) * (Aea / At - nut(4, 1))) ÷ nut(l, 1)
1790 NEXT l
1800 "END IF
1810 "
1820 "Compute thepseudoexitsurfaceturningangle (deg)
1830 '
1840 hues - (2.45 * ATN((.167 * (roaches 2 - 1)) " .5) - ATN((mchea
"2 - 1)" .5)) * 18o Ipi
1850 "
1860 "Compute the surface loeafion of the mmch line if it contac_ the
ground
i870 'thenozzlebell(turningangleislessthan 85 degrees)
1880 "
Ngeight Flow Pate ([b/s)
. "I_rmtTemperature(R)
.5 Whroat Speed of Sound (ft/s)
_-oat Area (ft)
'Nozzle Exit Radius (ft)
"Pseudoexit Surface Area (ft)
V
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1890
1900
1910
1920 "END IF
1925 '
1930 'Calculations
1935 "
1950 RA-pi * PD " 2/4
1960 PV-pi*PD'316
ml - 0
IF nues >- 85 THEN 1920
xml - re - NH * .3048 * TAN(hues * pi I 180)
'Ref.Area <m'2>
"ParticleVolume <m" 3>
"ParticleMass <kg>1970 PM - ROL * PV
1980 PRINT : PRINT : PRINT "Calculating Velocity of 150 Micron
Particles': PRINT
1985 PRINT "PercentComplete', "Velocity<m/s>"
1990 GOSUB I0010 "ParticleImpact Velocity
20O0 LOCATE 5, 1
2010 PRINT USING "& #4t_', "150 Micron Particle Impact Velocity
<m/s> -', XD
2020 GOSUB 14010 'Particle Damage
2030 PRINT USIN(] "& ##.# .... ", "Particle Crater Diameter - AI 2024T3
<mm> : ", PCDA
2040 PRINT USING "& _.# .... "; "Particle Crater Diameter - Glass Bit
<nun> : "; PCDG
2050 GOSUB 16010 'ParticleFlux
2060 PRINT USING "& ######'; "Particle Flux <#/cm'2/s>
-'; PFX
2070 DAMA - PFX * BD * pi * 0PCDA / 10) " 2 / 4
2080 IF DAMA > 1 THEN DAMA - 1
2090 DAM(] - PFX * BD * pi * (PCDG / 10) " 2 [ 4
21 O0 IF DAM(] > 1 THEN DAM(] - 1
2110 PRINT : PRINT "For a 5 second exposure at "; DLS, "meters:"
2120 PRINT USING "##it.# &', DAMA * 100; " Percent of an Alnminnm
Surface is Pitted"
2130 PRINT USIN(] "#44 &", DAM(] * 100; " Percent of a Glass
Surface is Pitted"
2140 END
10000 ' - .............................................................
10010 _ Particle Impact Velocity [
10020 ' - ............................................. - ...........
10030 • - (re * 17.1) * .3048 'Initial conditions
10050 XD - 0
10070 TIME- 0
10120 GOSUB 11020 "gas density and velocity
10130 "Impulsive Force
10140 FIMP - .5 * DENS * 16.02 * (VELO * .3048) " 2 * RA * CD
10150 'Acceleration (question the Absolute)
10160 XDD - FIMP/PM
10180 'Local particle Gs
10190 (]P - FIMP / PM [ (]L
10200'PRINT"lime • y r t xd yd xdd ydd fimp rog vg
gp"
10210 'PRINT USING "#.t_t #_.# ###.# ##.# #4L_ _.# t_.# #4tt_
#it#.# # .... # .... #it## ###.#'; time; x; y; r;, t; xd; yd; xdd; ydd; Irnnp;
R(]g; Vg; Gp
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10220 IF DENS < .00001 THEN 10260
10230 OOSUB 13010 "Integrate ...... _ _- - _.......
10240 ' PRINT USING "#.## #4/4.# #_#.# ##.# #4.## #4/4.# #4.# #4J4#
#_IP.# # .... # .... _ #_.#'; lime; x; y; r; t; xd; yd; xdd; ydd; Fimp;
ROg; Vg; Op
10250 GOTO 10220
10260 'END IF
10270 RETURN
11000" - ................................................................
11010 '[ Gas Density and Velocity [
11020 ' - .............................................................
11030 "
11040 'If the particle's position is inside the roach llne, then assume that
I 1050 "the gas flow is choked; the inch number is I. Otherwise Expand
11060 '_ _ _e assumptions of _dtl-Meyer-_theo_!:
11070 '
11080 IF x I .3048 < ml THEN
11090 inch- I ........
i I i00 DENS - denst
IIII0 temp-tt
11120 VELO - sost
II130 theta-0
11140 ELSE ..... _ ..... _: _ ........ _ _
11150 " : :
11160" Calculate the expansion wave surfsce ugle (deg)
11170 '
11180 HUMOR - NH / .3048: DENOM - x1.3048 re: OOSUB 17000
'ArcTan 360 ..... = === ..... __ = =
11210' Determine the local math number
11220 " _ =
11230 FORi-ITO359
11240 mtheta - nut(3, i) - nut(2, i) + hues
11250 mthetapl - nut(3, i + 1) - nut(2, i ÷ 1) + hUeS
11260 IF theta < mtheta THEN math - (nut(l, i + 1) - nut(l, i)) /
(mthetap I - mtheta) • (theta - mtheta) + nut(l, i)
11270 NEXT i .......
11280 dl0 - (I / (I + .2 • inch " 2)) " 2.5 "Gas Density Ral/o
I 1290 '
11300 ' If the particle is far from the nozzle (Le. >10*re) then expand the
11310" source flow two dimensionally, otherwise expand Prandtl-Meyer
radially.
I 1320 "
11330 r-(NH'2+x'2)'.S/.3048 q)istanceinft
11340 IFr> 100 * re THEN PRINT "SegaUve Weighl_g Being Com-
putedf"
11350 w2- LOG(rlre)/LOG(10)I2
I1360 wl- l-w2 _ _i_
I 1380 de0 - cf * dl0 "Corrected Gas Density RaUo
11390 machc- ((I Idc0 " (I 12.5) - 1) 1.2) " .5 'Corrected Mach
Number
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11400 DENS - dens0 * dc0
11410 temp-t01(l +.2 * machc 2)
(R)
11420 sos - (1.4 * 53.3 * 32.174 * temp) " .5
Sound (ft/s)
11430
11440
11450
13000
13010
13020
13025
13030
13050
13070
13120
13130
'LocalGas Den_ty 0b/ft'3)
'Local Gas Temperatnre
"LocalSpeedof
VELO - machc * sos "Local Gas Velocity (ft/s)
ENDIF
'1 _tegrate I
LOCATE 10, h PRINT LOG(DENS) I LO_.00001) * 100,, XD
x - x + XD * DTIME + .5 * XDD * DTIME 2
XD - XD + XDD * DTIME
TIME - TIME + DTIME
GOSUB 11020 "gu density and velocity
'Impulsive Force
13140 FIMP " .5 * DENS * 16.02 * (VELO * .3048) " 2 * RA * CD
13150 'Acceleration (question the Absolute)
13160 XDD - FIMP/PM
13180 'Local particle Gs
13190 GP - FIMP / PM / GL
13200 RETURN
14000 ' - .................................................................
14010 "l Particle Damage I
14020 ' - .................................................................
"THOR Ref. Area
' <in'2_
'Projectile Density
"ProjectileMass <g>
• <grains>
'THOR Velocity <ft/s>
14030 TRA - (pi * PD" 3 / 6) " (21 3)
<m'2_
14040 TRA - TRA 1.3048 " 2 * 12 " 2
14050 ROP - 3.34 * 100 " 3
<g/m'3>
14060 TPM " pi * PD " 3 1 6 * ROP
14070 TPM - TPM / 453.6 * 7000
14080 TV - SQR(XD "2 + YD " 2) I .3048
14090 IA " 0 "Impact Angle <rad>
14100 "THOR Coefftcienls for Aluminum 2024-T3
14110 Cl - 6.185: ALPHAI - .903: BETAI - -.941: GAMMAI - 1.098
14120 GOSUB 15010 "THOR EquatoB
14130 PCT)A - PDI
WHOR Coefficients for Bullet Resistant
CI - 6.991: ALPHAI - 1.316: BETAI - -1.351: OAMMAI -
14140
14150
1.289
14160
14170
GOSUBIS010 WHOREquatons
PtZT)G- PDI
14180RETUILN
15000'- .............................................................
15010"l THOR Equafions I
15020 '- ...............................................................
15030 PDE- ((TV I(10 " Cl *TPM " BETAI * (1 1COS(IA)) " GAM-
MAI)) " (l /ALPHAI))/TRA
15040 PDI - PDE * 2.5 "Crater Diameter - 2.5 * Penetration
Depth
15050 PDI - PDI * 25.4 "CraterDiameter<mm>
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15060__RETURN == - .... :
16000' -................................"'"....."......................
16010 "I ParticleFlux l
16020 '-...............................................................
16030 NOP - OBS / RA "Number of Pnxticles
_/m'2>
16040 "Assume that the obscuringappliestoa Imeter depth
16050 NOP - NOP * I "Number of Particles
<#Ira'3>
16060 PFX.I - NOP * SQR(XD " 2 + YD " 2) "InitialParticleFlux
<-#/m"2/s>
16070 "IniUaldistancefrom the landings/tefor I cubicmeter volume •m>.
16080 DI = 5
16090 PFX - PPXI * (DI I DLS) " 2 "IrmalPart/de Flux
<#1m"2/s>
16100 PPX " PFX * .0001 'ParUcleFlux
<#/ca" 2/s>
161I0 RETURN
17000 '-................................................................
17010 "I ArcTan360 [
17020 '-................................................................
17030 "
17040 IF NUMOR > 0 AND DENOM - 0 THEN 17050 ELSE 17070
17050 angle - pi/2
17060 GOTO 17240
17070 "ELSE
17080 IF DENOM - 0 THEN 17090 ELSE 17110
17090 angle - 3 * pi/2
17100 GOTO 17230
17110 ' ELSE
17120 IF (NUMOR > 0 OR NUMOR - 0) AND DENOM > 0 THEN
17130 ELSE 17150
17130 angle - ATN(NUMOR I DENOM)
17140 GOTO 17220
17150' ELSE
17160 IF NUMOR • 0 AND DENOM > 0 THEN 17170 ELSE 17190
17170 angle - 2 * pi + ATN(NUMOR / DENOM)
17180 GOTO 17210
17190 ' ELSE
17200 angle - pi + ATN(NUMOR /DENOM)
17210' ENDIF
17220 ' ENDIF
17230 ' ENDIF
17240 'ENDIF
17250 RETURN
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Appendix C
Data and Calculations
Supporting the Thermal/Micromcteoroid
Protection Trade Study
Mass Estimates
• This appendix contains the data and calculations which were used in the Thermal/Micrometeoroid
Protection Trade Study to make mass estimates of each of the four protection options. The data is
presented in a spreadsheet fashion.
V
VEHICLE SELF-PROTECTION
Rssume the need to protect from the cargo interface to the engine bell exit:
Height: 17 ft.
Radius: 13 ft.
Fabric mass Z.IZ Ib/yd*2 (Rssume I/3 PSS mass added to existing insulation)
Cylinder surface = (pi)(R'Z)(h)
= 3.1416"13"2"17 = 9025.81B sq.ft.
Engine area cover = pI(R*Z) = 3.141B.13"2 = 530.9304
Total cover area =
Cover Rrea (sq.f%.} 9,557
(sq.yd.) l,OBZ
Fabric Mass (Ibs.) 2,Z51
(kg) 1,023
Support/Deployment Hardware (Ibs)
(kg)
174
79
Total mass (lbs) Z,425
(kg) 1,10Z
9556.747 sq.ft.
C- I
THERMAL BLANKET AND R-FRAME TENT
Rluminum poles: 6 inch dis uith I/8" ua11, 3/16" ua11, or I/4" wall
1/8" uall thickness:
circumference = 3.14 (6) = 18.84 Inches
in'3/ft of pole: I8.84(O.1ZS)(IZ) = ZB.Z6 In'3
mass/ft of pole (a o.egSlbs/in^3): ZB.Z6(e.098) = Z.76948
3/15" wall thickness:
(1.5 times I/8 wall)
1.5(Z.76945) = 4.154ZZ Ibs/ft
1/4" wall thickness:
(Z times I/B uall)
Z(Z.76948) =
Be £t vertical pole (ea):
40 ft ridge pole:
Hyp = (60"Z+_Z-)*0.5 =
Total pole mass (lbs):
5.53896 lbs/ft
Wall Thickness
l/B" 3/IG" 1/4"
166.17 Z49.Z5 33Z.34
443.1Z 564.68 8Re. Z3
Thermat blanket (OrcofiIm AN-ZZ or 55F MLI):
Top Area = S4*4e*Z = 5,1Ze ft'Z =
End Area = 6e,4e*e.s.z = Z,400 ft'z =
Total Rrea =
Fabric Mass Q 6.351b/yd'Z
569 yd'Z
Z67 yd'Z
7,SZ@ 836 yd^Z
5,3e6 Ibs Z,41Z kg
Drive mechanism (Z ea):
Misc attach harduare:
Total misc:
5e tee lee
ZS 58 Se
75 15@ 15@
TOTAL MASS (Ibe)
(kg)
5,8Z4 6,1Z@ 6,34Z
Z,647 Z,TBZ 2,883
V
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LANDER SKIRT
Height: ZO ft.
Top radlue: 13 ft.
Bottom radium: 19.5 f_.
Fabric mass 6.35 Ib/yd'Z
Conical eur£ace = (pl)(R)(R'Z + h_Z)*0.S
Total cone = 3.1416*Ig.5*(19-S*Z ÷60*Z)A0.S =
Truncated part = 3.1416*13*(13AZ+40"Z)_0.S =
Truncated cone (manned vehicle) =
Top cover = pi(R^Z) = 3.141G*I3_Z =
Truncated cone + cover (unmanned vehicle) =
Unmanned Manned
Vehicle Vehicle
Cover Area (sq.f_.) Z,S?8 Z,147
(eq.yd.) Z98 Z39
Fabric Mass (Ibs.) 1,890 I,SIS
(kg) 8S9 G89
Hoisting Harduare (lbs) 400 400
(kg) IBZ IBZ
Total mame (lbs) Z,Z90 1,915
(kg) 1,041 870
3864.9Z1
1717.74Z
2147.178 5q.fl.
530.9304
2678.1@8 5q.ft.
C-3
ERECTABLE STORP_E FACILITY
Each Bay: 45 ft deep x 4S ft high x 45 ft wide
Errectable Trusses: 119 lbs each
Truss plates: Z8 lbs each (top and bottom of each truss)
Alignment-Compression Bars: 3.3B lb/£t
Tension Cross Braces: 0.03 lb/£t
0eployRent mechanism 170 Ibm
Cover Fabric: G.35 Ib/yd^Z
One Bay Tug Bays Three Bays
Errectable Trusses: (No.) 4
(Ibs) 476
(kg) 216
Truss Plates: (No.) B
(lbs) Z24
(kg) 10Z
Alignment-Compresslon Trusses
(linear £eet) 368
(Ibs) I,ZI7
(kg) $53
Tension Cross Braces
(linear £eet) B40
(Ibs) 19
(kg) S
Deployment Mechanism (No.) 1
(Ibm) 170
(kg) 77
Fabrtc Cover (sq.ft.) 8,100
(sq.yd.) 900
(lbs) 5,715
(kg) Z,SBB
TOTAL FACILITY (lbe) 7,8Z1
(kg) 3,555
B 8
714 gSZ
3Z5 433
12 IS
336 448
153 Z04
630 900
Z,IZB 3,04Z
968 1,383
10Z4 1408
31 42
14 18
I I
170 170
7? 77
1Z,150 IB,Zee
1,3S0 1,800
8,573 11,430
3,887 5,1BS
11,853 16,084
5,433 7,311
C- 4
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Contained is a description of the the operations that would bc required to implement the three
surface-based protection options. From this description, flowcharts were generated. The flow
charts illustrate the flow of tasks to use the three surface-based prow,ction options. Associated with
each of the tasks is a timelinc which was generated by using equivalent KSC operations to make
time estimates. These time estimates were used in the trade study to make a comparative analyses
of each of the protection options.
-..._j,
EVA-MANHOUR ESTIMATES FOR THE
LUNAR THERMAI.JMICROMETEOROID OPTIONS
The following discussion explains the scenarios associated with the erection of three protection options -
the storage facility, the vehicle skirt, and the A-frame options.
The scenarios assume that there are two astronauts performing the assembly steps. They are performing
simultaneous tasks in close proximity. However, one is not acting as an observer for the other. The man-
hour estimates are based on similar earth tasks and do not take into account the complexities or limiting
factors on the lunar surface.
v
STORAGE FACILITY ERECTION SCENARIO
Prior to beginning the erection of the storage facility, the site would have to be prepared. Surveying can
be done using precursor space craft which would survey the lunar surface, looking for suitable sites for
establishing a lunar base. Even though a site is suitable for a base, it may still require grading and other
regolith moving activities. For this reason the site preparations are not included in the EVA man-hour
estimates for the erection of a storage facility. (They are not included in the other protection options
either.)
The activities which are included in the scenario for storage facility erection are illustrated in figure A-1.
This scenario begins with the facility preparations. The facility kit is removed from the lander, transported
to the erection site and unpacked.
Once the facility kit is at the erection site, the trusses, along with the spacing/alignment bars will be
removed from the containers. The trusses and the spacing alignment bars will be positioned and
connected.
Then the roofing system and its bracing willbe installed. This activity will require the erection and position
of fabric support stands which will be use to deploy and attach the roofing and sides. Once the roofing is
installed the sides will be positioned and attached to the truss structures.
Once all the protection material is attached to the trusses, the trusses will be raised and the tension cables
will be tightened to rigidize the structure. Then the fabric support stands will be stored.
The storage facility does not require repetitive erection. The only tasks that will be repetitive will be the
moving of the vehicle to the storage facility. This activity adds 13:50 hours to the EVA man-hours
associated with protecting the vehicle and preparing it for each flight.
The preparation and the moving of the vehicle into storage is depicted in figure A-1A. The storage facility
has a distinct advantage of permitting the storage of several vehicles and associated equipment under the
same protective system if sized for more than one vehicle. This maximizes commonality and minimizes the
total required protective system mass. The vehicle, once it lands will have fuel and oxidizer onboard. The
D .
presence of these commodities in proximity on the vehicle poses a hazard. This hazard is compounded if
several vehicles are close to each other. A catastrophic event may cause the loss of several vehicles and
pieces of support equipment. For this reason, removal of either the fuel or the oxidizer would reduce the
hazard level.
The vehicle must be raised, either by using jacks or a hoisting mechanism. After raising the vehicle, either
wheel assemblies will be attached or a wheeled dolly will be positioned under the vehicle and the vehicle
will be lowered. The tow bar will be attached and then the vehicle will be transferred to the storage facility.
Itwill be positioned and the vehicle and handling equipment will be secured.
A-FRAME ERECTION SCENARIO
The A-frame tent option requires the removal of the tent from storage and its erection around the vehicle
at its landing site which should also be a prepared site. However, the tent does require erection tasks that
will be repetitive from mission to mission. The scenario associated with this task is illustrated in figure A-2.
To provide protection using the A-frame tent, the tent will have to be removed from storage and taken to
the the landing site. The assembly of the A-frame involves using truss-IRe structures for two 60 foot
vertical poles and one 40 foot ridge pole. The blanket support frame will be assembled, positioned on the
surface, attached to opposite flight vehicle lander legs, and the erection drive mechanism will be attached.
The near-side edge of the blanket willbe secured to the surface by stakes or weights, and the far-side will
be attached to the frame guy wires. The frame will be erected to an upright position, deploying the near-
side half of the blanket and its guy wires in the process. The far guy wires will be extended to form an A-
frame the surface; and then the far-side edge of the blanket will be lowered to the surface and secured.
The A-frame also requires a disassembly scenario which is the reverse of the erection scenario and
includes dispatching the crew to the pad to remove the blankets, unstake the guy wires, lower the support
frame, remove the blankets form the frame and stowing them, disassembling the frame and returning the
disassembled A-frame tent to storage.
V
LANDER SKIRT OPTION
The scenario associated with this option is ilustrated in figure A-3. The lander skirt is similar to the A-frame
tent in concept. The skirtwould have to be removed from storage and taken to the landing site where it
would be attached to the side of the lander.
However, unlike the A-frame, the skirt concept depends upon the lander to provide the frame to which the
skirt could be attached. It also requires oonsiderable handling equipment because the skirts would have
to be hoisted and suspended while EVA crewmembers make the final attachment.
This concept requires the assembly of a hoisting mechanism, attaching the blankets to the hoisting
mechanism and raising the blankets to the location on the vehicle to where they will be attached. Once
the blankets are attached the hoisting mechanism will have tObe disassembled and returned to storage.
D . 2
To prepare the vehicle for launch, the removal of the skirtwould require the reverse of the assembly
steps. These tasks am repetitive for each vehicle and lor each flight.
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Appendix E
Database Records
Of
Centaur Test Proc_un_ Analysis
This appendix contains a printout of the database that was compiled by conducting an analysis of
Centaur prelaunch test procedures. The analysis was conducted to identify possible prelaunch tests
that would be required if using a liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen expansion cycle engine on a
Lunar Excursion Vehicle. The basis of the analysis was the Pratt and Whitmey RL-10 engine.
Database fields include the Centaur Test Procedure number, a description f the test, remarks,
resources required for the test, schedule data, special test equipment, and a recommendation of
whether the test should be retained, reduced in some manner, or deleted, for Planetary Surface
Systems launch and landing operations.
V
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP" CCLS VALIDATION ......... ]
Old CTP No. CCLS-5000 New CTP No. CCLS-0001
Description Verifies proper operation of the computer controlled launch set interfaces (ground equipment,
computer, peripherals and digital communication landlines) through the use of tenant
validation programs.
Remarks Run prior to vehicle support
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_l Vehicle Power O Pneumatics
Total Personnel 3 : Engr 1 Tech 1
m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 05/22/89 Shifts 5 Serial Operation i_]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
D CCLS r_
Insp 1 Safety
m m
Parallel Operation D
[PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain d Reduce IXI Delete U I
E- 1
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CCLS CALIBRATION .....
Old CTP No. CCLS-5002 New CTP No. CCLS-0002
Description Procedure for calibrating CCLS analog system, CCLS power supplies and digital interface
frequency generators.
I
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 3.._. : Engr__
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 3
m
.n.um.t,c.D
Tech Insp Ssfety --
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Voltmeter
Special Receivers
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce
Rationale: Reduce scope and modify for PSS computer system.
Delete
E-2
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
FUNCTIONAL ......CTP: DCU
=1 i IT
Old CTP No. DCU-5000T New CTP No.
Description The vehicle flight compuler (DCU) is subjected to a series of tests involving the memory, sum
and instruction tasks, constants loading, and interupt-clock-communications tests.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D Pneumatics D CCLS[_]
Total Personnel 2 : Engr Tech Insp Safety
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts__2 Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Parallel Operation _]
[PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain L_ Reduce LJ Delete LJ ]
E-3
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i LI
Y MODIFICATION
Old CTP No. DCU-5001B Now CTP No.
Description Provides instructions to alter the DCU permanent memory either on a single cell or 12K
memory load by special options. Post modification validation tests are performed.
I
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power O
"Total Personnel 2_ : Engr___.
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
mmmlmm
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics D CCLS D
Tech Inap Safety
mmmmlml
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation I_i
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain IXI Reduce LJ Delete I I !1
Rationale: Retain for contingency only.l
E- 4
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i i n iiCTP" FUGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS OPERATION
r
Old CTP No. FC-5001 New CTP No. FC-0001
Description An automated procedure to apply, remove and control Centaur and/or Atlas vehicle power,
control RF systems, control N2H4 engine solenoids, support Atlas propulsion testing, support
vent and pressurization system calibration, and hydraulic testing.
Remarks
have an interface with Flight Control.
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _ Vehicle Power_
Total Personnel 7 : Engr 4
m • m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 07/10/89 Shifts 2..=
m
Provides CCLS support to mechanical and propulsionsystem which require vehicle power and
Pneumatics I_1 CCLS r_l
Tech 2 Insp 1 Safety
m m m
Serial Operation r_l Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln L..J Reduce lxl Delete LJ
Rationale: A shorter version of this automated procedure could be used for preflight (or post
landing) checks for a Lunar/Mars vehicle.
E-5
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: FLIGHT CONTROL READINESS TEST
Old CTP NO. FC-5002 New CTP No. FC-1002
Description Provides a series of tests to assure that the flight control system operates within design
parameter limits. The test are performed under CCLS software control and consist of:
Sequence Control Unit functional; Servo Inverter Unit functional; Optical alignment test;
Engine Frequency Response tests in pitch and yaw; and Engine end-to-end test.
Remarks
I
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power [_] Vehicle Power D
_rotal Personnel 7_: Engr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 2.!
am
.o.um.,,c.D ::'sEi
Tech Inap S,,fety
m mm
Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Ground Hydraulic Supply
Optical Alignment Tool
Parallel Operation D
E-6
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP" CENTAUR GROUND AND AIRBORNE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CHECKOUT
Old CTP No. HYD-3130G New CTP No. HYD-0030
Description Performs fill, flush, bleed, leak check and engine gimballing and alignment checks.
Remarks Requires ground and vehicle electrical power, ground hydraulic servicer, and ground
pneumatics for blown downs
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ vehicle Powerr_ Pneumatlcsr_ CCLSr"]
Total Personnel 4 : Engr 1__ Tech 1 Insp 1 S=fety 1
m m m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Imm m
Start Date 06/22/89 Shifts 1__2 Serial Operation _ Parallel Operation u
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Ground Hydraulic Power Unit
Hydraulic Sampling Kit
J
Rationale: Delete for standard Lunar/Mars operations. Not practical for hydraulic actuators
and unnecessary for elector-mechanical actuators.
E-7
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
ii
CTP" CENTAUR HYDRAUUC SYSTEM OPERATION I
Old CTP NO. HYD-3131 New CTP No. HYD-0031
Description Provides instructions for the use of the HPS ground supply with other procedures, validation of
replacement units, and performance of engine gimbal tests in pitch and yaw. Provides detailed
instructions for step-by-step replacement of actuators and specifies technique for drying
hydraulic fluid.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
:Total Personnel 4 : Sngr__
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts ?
m
...urn.,,=.D CC' D
Tech Inap Safety --
m
Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Dipstick Indicator Guide
Hydraulic Power Supply (HPS)
Flex Hoses
Hydraulic Drying Apparatus
Hydraulic Sampling Kit
Parallel Operation D
Reduce
l Rationale: Retain portion dealing with c°ntingency actuat°r replacement" Remainder n°t 1
practical for hydraulic actuators and unneccessary for elecro-mechanical
actuators.
E- 8
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CENTAUR HYDRAULIC END-TO-END SYSTEM TEST
Old CTP No. HYD-3132 New CTP No. HYD-0032
Description Functionally checks the Centaur hydraulic power packs including a fill and bleed of the
hydraulic checkout unit, followed by performance tests of the main hydraulic pumps and
recirculation system. Tests the electrical hydraulic circulation motors and establishes a
current profile. Checks torque on hydraulic power package drive coupling.
Remarks Ground and vehicle electrical power, instrumentation, and hydraulic pumps are required
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _ Vehicle Power_ Pneumatics D
"Total Personnel 8, 8..: . Engr 2 Tech 4 Inspm mm m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
im,aq
Start Date 08/28/89 Shifts 3 Serial Operation X_
mm
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Hydraulic Checkout Unit
Flex Hoses
Electrical Cables
Dipstick Indicator Guide
CCLS O
2 Safety
Parallel Operation D
/
v
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain I I Reduce U Delete
Ratlonale: Delete for standard lunar/Mars operations. Not practical for hydraulic actuators
and unneccessary for elecro-mechanical actuators.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i
•[CTP: CENTAUR HYDRAUDLIC FLIGHT READINESS OPERATIONS I
Old CTP NO. HYD-3133 New CTP No. HYD-1033
Description Centaur airborne hydraulic systems are checked for proper bleed, a system fitting torque
check Is performed, and flight fluid sampling is accomplished. Ground hydrauliC pressure is
applied to the airborne system and the engines are moved in pitch and yaw with Flight Control
system.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _ Vehicle Power r_
Total Personnel 5 : Engr
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/12/89 Shifts 3
m
.n.um=,c.D  c.sD
Tech 2 Insp 1 Safety 1
mm m mm
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Dipstick Indicator Guides
Hydraulic System Service Panel (HSSP)
Hydraulic Power Supply (HPS)
Hydraulic Sampler Kit
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain U Reduce JXJ Delete LJ
Rationale: Delete portions dealing with fluid sampling and bleed checks for hydraulic
actuators. Modify tests to provide a pre-flight end-to-end test under command of
the flight control system for either type of actuator.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: IMG CALIBRATION
Old CTP No. IMG-5000T
Description
Remarks
New CTP No. IMG-1001
Provides checkout, calibration, and alignment of the Centaur Inertial Measurement Group
(IMG) using the computer controlled launch set (CCLS) including options for an IMG
calibration, IMG gimbal slew test, clock frequency test, steering chain test, navigation test, and
earth spin test.
The Earth spin test is run during each integrated test containing a plus count demonstration
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power I_ Vehicle Power [_]
Total Personnel 3 : Engr 1
m • /
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/21/89 Shifts 6
m
,n,°m,,,c,l--I" CC SF1
Tech 1 Insp 1 Smfety
I mamm m
Serial Operation _1 Parallel Operation ['7
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
[PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain I I Reduce IXl Delete LJ i
lRationale: A portion of this automated test could be performed as a pro-flight guidancesystem checkout on the planetary surface.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: LAUNCH COUNTDOWN OPERATIONS
Old CTP No. INT-XX00 New CTP No. INT-XXOO
Description Performs final preparations and launch for the for Atlas Centaur vehicle.
I
Remarks Vehicle and support equipment are in a flight (launch ready) configuration
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power [_ Vehlcle Power r_
• Total Personnel 80 : Engr 10
mmmmm=
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/21/89 Shlfts 2
tmmm
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics [_] CCLS r_
Tech 50 Insp 15 Ssfety 5...L .
m m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce Delete
Rationale: Required for planetary launch. Ground control functions to be reallocated to the
LEV/MEV for launch operations. Automate and customize,
E .
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
[ CTP: COMPOSITE ELECTRICAL READINESS TEST
Old CTP No. INT-XX01 New CTP No. WT-XX01
Description Demonstrates the vehicle with associated GSE on an integrated basis, the operation of all
airborne electrical systems (except range safety controller) during a simulated flight with
guidance in inertial mode and using telemetry and the gantry test rack for events, monitoring
Remarks Uses test batteries for internal power
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ D CCLS r_Vehicle Power _ Pneumatics
"Total Personnel 51 : Engr 29 Tech 19 Insp 3 Safety AR
m m m u m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/14/89 Shifts 1 Serial Operation l_l Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain LJ Reduce L.J
Ratlonale: Delete demonstration test for planetary surface operations.
verified during actual countdown.
Delete IXl
Readiness to be
E" 13
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: FLIGHT EVENTS DEMONSTRATIONi
Old CTP No. INT-XX02 New CTP No.
Description
Remarks
1. Demonstrates the Test Conductor ready and launch ladders will function properly for an
automatic release, including ordnance functions. 2. Demonstrates operation of the airborne
electrical system during a simulated flight with guidance in inertial mode after umbilical
ejection.
Part 1 is performed with umbilicals in, part 2 includes umbilical ejection. Both parts are
performed using test batteries for internal power
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power [_] Vehicle Power _]
Total Personnel 46 : .Engr 2._.9
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/07/89 Shlfte 1
m
 n.um.t.c.l CC,SlTI
Tech 14 Insp 3 Safety AFI
m m
Serial Operation D
I
Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain L.J
Rationale: Delete for planetary surface operations,
launch countdown.
Reduce U Delete xL_.J
Prelaunch portion to be included in
E- 14
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP" TERMINAL COUNTDOWN DEMOSTRATION
Old CTP No. INT-XX03 New CTP No. INT-0003
Description Complete tanking test in a simulated countdown.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
Total Personnel 80 : Engr ._.
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 2
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics D
Tec h Insp
m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
I
II ±
[ CTP" LANDLINE MULTIPLEXER OI_ERATION & PROGRAMING
Old CTP No. LL-3008 New CTP No. LL-1009
Description Power up, pr_raming and program verification, and functional operation of the landline
Instrumentation system multiplexer.
I
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D PneumatlcsD
Total Personnel 3 : Engr Tech
_mmlmam m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 2 Serial Operation LJ
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Computer
Keyboard & Video Displays
Tape Recorder
CCLS
Inep Safety
m
Parallel Operation D
[PSS RECOMMENDATION: RetainLJ Reduce L._I Delete IXI' i
L,,t,on,. 'hs's,=v,,r"c=ono _n_"n_'=n'r ut'_x'rsyst"__n'so_rt°' '_'_or°un_1
station verification exercise. It is not part of the actual Centaur processing.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
r
CTP" ATLAS/CENTAUR CORROSION CONTROL
Old CTP No. MECH-3009A New CTP No. MECH-0008
Description Cleans, Inspects for, removes, and applies corrosion protection on a periodic basis to the
exposed vehicle surfaces.
Remarks
day, weekly, 3 per week, or one per flow basis. Uses GN2 for purges
Specific tasks allocated to area purges, surface cleaning and coating on an annual, 60 day, 30
Pneumatics D CCLS
Tech 3 Insp 1
m m
Safety__
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 4 : Engr
m • m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/05/89 Shifts 5
m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation _]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
i in
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln JXJ Reduce L..J Delete J J
Rationale: Planetary surface environmental conditions, vehicle, and surface equipment
design will determine associated contamination control requirements for
LEV/MEV.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CC)MP! l:::X _L::LFCTRICAL READINESS TESTr
i I
Old CTP NO. NET-1002 New CTP No. NET-0002
Description Installs or verifies proper electrical support equipmenl/cable connections are in place for
vehicle errection, periodic once-a-week checks, TCD-3 day preps, and launch preps for
ground launch control systems.
I
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 3._3_. : Sngr 1
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/08/89 Shifts 6
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics O CCLS D
Tech 1 Insp 1 S,,fety
m m
Serial Operation r_ Parallel Operation D
V
Rationale: A similar but shorter version would be applicable for SSE to LEV/MEV verification
or for initial use. Performance would be accomplished prior to interconnection of
SSE with LEV/MEV.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: 28V DC POWER SUPPLYFUNCTIONAL CHECKOUT OF
Old CTP No. NET-3019 New CTP No. NET-1023
Description Verifies the operation of the Atlas/Centaur 28 volt ground power supplies conform to vehicle
test requirements including over-voltage protection and over-voltage turn-off operations.
Power supply calibration included.
Remarks Performs loads tests with vehicle and block house loads disconnected, sets over-voltage
prolection adjustmenls
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle P°werD D
: Sngr 1
Shifts 5
m
"Total Personnel 3
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 04/20/89
Pneumatics CCLS
Tech 1 Insp 1 S=fety
m m m
Serial Operation r_ Parallel Operation O
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Voltmeter
J
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln L_J Reduce LJ Delete L.J
Rationale: Perform for initial validation of LEVIMEV Servicer Power Subsystem and only
repeat for maintenance or repairs.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i
[ CTP: ALTAS/CENTAUR AIRBORNE ELECTRICAL READINESS
Old CTP No. NET-3066 New CTP No. NET-1032
Description Performs final closeout of vehicle electrical quick disconnects and snap lock connectors,
attaching hardware and enclosures.
Remarks
prior to launch -2 days, launch -1 day, and launch day
Applicable sections of procedure are performed to secure or verify approximately 200 items
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D PneumatlcsD
'rotal Personnel 4_: Engr 1 Tech 2 Inapm m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/08/89 Shllts 6_. Serial Operationl I
CCLS D
1 Safety
Parallel Operation [_]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
V
L Rationale: Delete, except when connectors are disturbed due to modifications or
replacement.
I I 6
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
J
CTP: CENTAUR MAIN BA'I-I'ERY ACTIVATION & HANDLING
Old CTP No. NET-3071 New CTP No. NET-1035
Description Performs handling, activation, recharging, load testing, storing, checkout and discharging of
the Centaur main battery.
J
Remarks Also used to prepare non-flight test batteries.
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 3 : Engr 1
m
m •
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/02/89 Shifts 4
mlmamllm
Pneumatics D
Tech 1 Insp
m
Serial Operation D
CCLS D
1 Safety
Parallel Operation i_]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Battery Activation Stand
Vacuum Pump
Strip Chart Recorder with Multiple Channel Recorders
Reduce
E- 21
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
11=
CTP: AIRBORNE BATTERY ACTIVATION & HANDLING I
I i
Old CTP NO. NET-3072 _ r% Ne w CTP NO" NET-1036
Description Performs handling, activation, recharging, load testing, storing, checkout and discharging of
flight termination system batteries.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
Total Personnel 3 - Engr 1
m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date _ 9/12/89 Shifts 4
m
SPECIAL TEST
Pneumatics D CCLS D
Tech 1 Insp 1 Safety
m m
Serial Operation D
EQUIPMENT Battery Activation Stand
Vacuum Pump
Strip Chart Recorder
Parallel Operation I'_
V
PSS RECOMMENDATION: '" Retain I l Reduce I l Delete lXl 1
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: PURGE AND PRESSURIZATION OF FLIGHT CONTROL UNITS
Old CTP No. NET-3075 New CTP No. NET-0039
Description Performs pressure and leak test on the airborne flight control Sequence Control Unit, and the
Servo Inverter Unit.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
Total Personnel 3 : Engr
m • mmumm
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics D CCLS D
Tech Insp Safety
m m m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
Portable Suitcase with Pneumatic Attachments &
Hoses
GN2 Bottle & Pressure Regulator
v
PSS RECO_MMENDATION: Retaln Reduce Delete
:
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
ill
i
CTP: INSTALLATION/REMOVAL OF SIU/SCU/RGU I
II 1 T
Old CTP No. NET-3081 New CTP No. NET-0044
Description Describes lhe methods for installing and removing the Servo Inverter Unit, Sequence Control
Unit, and Rate Gyro Unit.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 3 : Engr
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics D
Tech Insp
m
Serial Operation D
CCLS D
Safety
m
Parallel Operation D
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: AND COMPATIBILITY TESTINITIAL CURRENT PROFILE
Old CTP NO. NET-3082 New CTP No. NET-0045
Description Applies initial vehicle power, checks external/internal operation, and obtains reference
current profiles. Verifies compatibility of propulsion, RF, and engine circulation pump
systems with electrical power system. Simulated countdown under ground computer (CCLS)
control and simrnulated flight sequence under airborne computer software performed.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power I_] Vehicle Power
Total Personnel 23 : Engr 8
m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 6/20/89 Shifts 1
m
SPECIAL TEST
Pneumatics r_l CCLS I_ ]
Tech 1 0 Insp 5 Safety
mmmmm mlmmlmm m
Serial Operation !_]
EQUIPMENT Battery Simulator Supply
Battery Interrupt Boxes (BIB)
BIB Interconnect Cables
Parallel Operation D
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain U Reduce IXI Delete LJ !
Rationale: Reduce to an automated systems check, enabling direct operation from the LEV, or
remotely from the Lunar/Earth base ground computer.
f II
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
I
CTP" PYRO CHECKOUT i
Old CTP No. ORD-3000A New CTP No. ORD-0001
Description Provides checkout of pyrotechnic devices prior to assigning and installing them on the flight
vehicle. Provides fit and operational tests.
Remarks Performs isolation and resistance checks of rocket motors, destruct units, squibs, igniters,
detonators, safe and arm switches. Also, provides fit checks and operational tests.
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 4_: Sngr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/07/89 Shifts 4
tm
c ,sD
Tech 2 Insp 1 Safety _._..
mmmmmmm immmmB
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation [_]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Megohmmeters
Low Resistance Ohmmeters
Timer Units
Breakout Boxes
V
;S RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce Delete
Rationale: Preform isolation resistance tests prior to earth and/or SSF departure. Use
automated capability of Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) for functional tests.
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V
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT OF CENTAUR FILL AND DRAIN VALVES ]
Old CTP No. PLS-1005 New CTP No. PLS-0002
Description Installs and tests Centaur fill and drain valves, including leak tests, dew point verification of
transfer lines, connects ground fill and drain valves to airborne fill and drain valves and
verifies proper operation of valves and indications.
Remarks Requires ground and vehicle power, GN2 (GHE for LH2) for blow down purges, and a halogen
(or equivalent leak detector)
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_l Vehicle Power r_ Pneumatics r_ CCLS
: Engr 2 Tech 3 Inap 2
Shifts 5 Serial Operation _1
m
_rotal Personnel 7
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 08/24/89
Safety
Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Guide Studs
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain L_J Reduce LJ Delete L..]
Rationale: A similar operation will be required for planetary surface operations if surface
storage tanks, reliquifaction, or other propellant transfer operations are planned.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
I
CTP" CENTAUR VENT VALVE CHECKOUT
Old CTP No. PNEU-3019 New CTP No. PNEU-0026
Description Vedfies proper opening and closing of the LH2 and LOX tank vent valves.
pressures are determined.
I
Opening and closing
Remarks Requires tanks be raised above their fragmentation and normal operation levels and is
therefore a hazardous test
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _] V.hlcl, Pow,rl_! Pneumatlcs[X_
Total Personnel 1 0 : Engr .--.-1 Tech ...--.-5 Inap
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 07/18/89 Shifts 1 Serial Operation r_
m
CCLS O
2 Safety 2
mm
Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
l Rationale: Delete for planetary surface operations/check for last time on earth. 1
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CENTAUR AIRBORNE HIGH PRESSURE HEUUM STORAGE CHECKS
Old CTP No. PNEU-3021 New CTP No. PNEU-0027
Description Verifies the structural integrity of the airborne helium storage system including remote
pressurization of storage bottles to flight pressures, a five minute Iockup, a leak check at
lower pressures and purge system, checks
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power I_] Vehicle Power r_
Total Perlonnel 1 0 : Engr
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/27/89 Shifts 5
m
,n.u°.,,c.I;'1 CC'SI--I
Tech 5 Insp 1 Safety 3
m m m
Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Helium Bottle Charge Panel
Parallel Operation _'!
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln IXl Reduce Delete L_J
Rationale: All pressurized systems on the LEV/MEV should be designed such that all leak
and pressure testing can be accomplished using BIT/BITE.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i
] ![ CTP: LH2 VENT SYSTEM LEAK CHECK
Old CTP No, PNEU-3022 New CTP No. PNEU-0028
Description Performs leak checks of the Centaur airbome LH2 vent system on a step-by-step basis as
ducting is assembled.
Remarks Uses ground supply of helium for pressurization and leak tests
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power rx--_ vehicle Power[_]
"Total Personnel 5 : Engr 1
=ram=m=
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 07/10/89 Shifts 1_5
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics El CCLSD
Tech 3 Inap 1 Safety
m m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation _]
V
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce Delete
Rationale: Delete. Ducting is pecular to Centaur design as an upper stage of an ELV.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CENTAUR CCVAPS SYSTEM CHECKOUT ]
Old CTP No. PNEU-3025 New CTP No. PNEU-0032
Description Applies pressure to the computer controlled venting and pressurization system transducers and
tank pressure transducers for performing an end-to-end calibration and leak checks.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power r_
Total Personnel 6 : Engr 2
m . m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 08/04/89 Shifts 2
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics rx_ CCLS r_
Tsch _3 Insp _1 Safety
Serial Operation [_ Parallel Operation[--1
CCVAPS Pressure Control Panel
Calibrated Gage
Flex Hoses
Filter
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln L..J Reduce _ Delete L.J
Rationale: Delete transducer calibration test for planetary surface operations except for
mandatory repairs/replacements or pre Earth launch verification. Substitude
prelaunch functional test with special software routine.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
i i|l
CTP: CENTAUR AIRBORNE PNEUMATIC SYS i t:M CHECKOUT I
f
Old CTP NO. PNEu-3026 New CTP No. PNEU-0031
Description Performs operational and leak checks of airborne pneumatic system valves and components
including a remote high pressure helium storage cycle. The gaseous helium bottles are
pressurized to flight pressures and pressurization and control valves are retested for leaks.
The autogenous (GH2 bleed system) pressurization lines, valves, orifices are tested.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power [_] Vehicle Power [_]
"Total Personnel 8__ Ertgr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 07/19/89 Shifts 6
==am
,..um.t,c.El cc.sD
Tech 3 Insp 2 Safety 2
mm mm
Serial Operation r_
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Helium Bottle Charge Panel
Flex Hoses
Flow Meters
Parallel Operation D
V
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce Delete
Rationale: Reduce for planetary operations to functional tests of components using BIT/BITE,
and leak checking for repair or replacement only.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP" & WHITNEY ENGINE LEAK & FUNCTIONAL CHECKCENTAUR PRATT
i
Old CTP No. PROP-3131N New CTP No. PROP-0036
Description Performs transducer calibrationsand leak and functional checks of engines and associated
hardware.
Remarks Uses fixed and portable groundsupport equipment
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_l Vehicle Power r_ I Pneumatics rx-'l CCLS r_
Total Personnel 6 : Engr 1 Tech 3 Insp 1 Safety 1
m • m m malmBma m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/28/89 Shifts 1..._1 Serial Operation r_ Parallel operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Portable Pneumatic Checkout Panel
Flow Meters
Flex Hoses
Pressure Test Plates & Fixtures
Propulsion Checkout Panel
Leakage Detector Fixture
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain LJ Reduce Ixl Delete LJ
Rationale: Develop a condensed version that uses special built in test capabilities of the
LEVIMEV engines.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CENTAUR PROPULSION FLIGHT READINESS OPERATIONS
Old CTP No. PROP-3133 New CTP No. PROP-0040
Description Propulsion components are functionally checked for flight and the propulsion system Is
partially configured for flight such as turbopump torque checks, final leak checks, and
preliminary blowdowns are accomplished. Both the LH?_/LO2and N2H4 systems are checked.
Remarks Blowdownsand leak checks are performedusingGN2 and GHe
I
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power r_l
Total Personnel 5._._ : Sngr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/08/89 Shifts 7
,n.°m.t,c.E] cc.n
1 Safety 1Tech 2 Insp
m
Serial Operation O Parallel Operation
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Backup Engine Purge Panel
Flow Meters
Flex Hoses
Portable Pneumatic Checkout Panel
Propulsion System Checkout Panel
Purge Manifold
V
' ' ' U I' II . Ixl orPSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain educe elete
Rationale: A shortened version would be required on the planetary surface; increased use of I
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: AIRBORNE N2H4 SYSTEM LEAK & FUNCTIONAL
ii =
Old ¢TP No. PROP-3156 New CTP No. PROP-0037
Description Performs hydrazine RCS engine functional checks, valve leak checks, N2H4 bottle leak checks,
thruster loop leak checks, and RCS line heater checks.
Remarks
checked with a Mass Spectrometer.
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _ Vehicle Power_
Total Personnel 5 : Engr 1
m • m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 10/12/89 Shifts 6
m
SPECIAL TEST
High pressure helium gas is used to perform tests, not hydrazine. Thruster loop is leak
Pneumatics rxl CCLS O
Tech 2 Insp 1 Safety 1
m m m
Serial Operation _ Parallel Operation D
EQUIPMENT Hydrazine Service Panel & Vacuum Pump
N2H4 RCS GSE Test Kit
N2H4 Mass Spectrometer Fill & Sample Kit
Valve & Filter Assembly (for Mass Spectrometer Kit)
Mass Spectrometer
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln LJ Reduce xLxJ Delete I l
Rationale: Develop a condensed version that uses LEV/MEV Built-inTest capability for leak
and functional tests.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
[ CTP" RCS THRUSTER LOOP PRE.SSURIZATION _J
Old CTP NO. PROP-3158 New CTP NO. PROP-0033
Description N2H4 RCS thruster loop is pressurized periodically to support thruster engine cycling during
major tests.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
Total Personnel 4 : Engr_.._,..
mm
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
mm
.n.°m.,c.D _C'_D
Tech Insp S=fety
m am m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Hydrazine Service Panel & Vacuum Pump
N2H4 RCS GSE Test Kit
r.ss RECO..E.OATIO"..,.'. LJ ..°c. L_I o.,.t.Ixl !
Rationale: Delete. RCs manifold will be filled with flight propellant.
E- 36
V
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
\ CTP: CENTAUR PU SYSTEM CHECKOUT & CALIB
Old CTP NO. PU-5000 New CTP No. PU-1005
Description Performs checkout and calibration of the propellant utilization system prior to flight.
includes the servo positioner limit checks and valve angles with PU associated errors.
This
Remarks Options are provided to perform calibrations, data printout, load flight constants, perform
functional checks and load the ground computer (CCLS)
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power [_] Vehicle Power r_
Total Personnel :3 : Sngr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/22/89 Shifts 2
m
I--I CC' E!
Tech 1 inap 1 Safety .--.-.,.
m m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain [_J Reduce IXI Delete L_
Rationale: Reduce to automated functional check for planetary surface use. Most options call
for leaving propellants on board, or refilling, without emptying tanks. Ulimate use
will depend upon if a PU system is incorporated into the LEV/MEVdesign.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
m ii
[ CTP: LO2 & LH2 PU CABLES & PROBE INSULATION RESISTANCE CHECKS
I I l III I I
Old CTP No. PU-5001 New CTP No. PU-1006
Description Performs Insulation resistance checks of the LO2 and LOX propellant utilization system cables,
connectors, and probes.
Remarks Requires vehicle power off; breaks into PU probe interfaces to perform megger tests
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
;rotal Personnel 3 : Engr
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/19/89 Shifts 2
m
,°.urn.,.=.D Cc' D
Tech 1 Insp 1 Safety
m m m
Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Breakout Boxes _
Megohmmeters
Parallel Operation I_]
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln U Reduce U Delete Ixl
Rationale: Delete as standard test on Lunar/Mars surface, would invalidate system with
propellants on board. Perform prior to earth and/or SSF departure.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
L _-
CTP: C-BAND BEACON PRESSURIZATION AND LEAK TEST
Old CTP No. RF-3002 New CTP No. RF-0001
Description Performs pressurization and leak test on the airborne and back-up C-Band transponders.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D
Total Personnel 3 : Engr
m • m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
m
E]Pneumatics CCLS
Tech Insp Safety
m m m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Suitcase with Pressure Fittings & Hoses
GN2 Source & Regulator
E- 39
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
T
CTP" C-BAND BEACON SYSTEM CHECKOUT I
Old CTP NO. RF-3005 New CTP No. RF-0002 %=_f
Description Provides system level checkout of the C-Band transponder. Parameters tested are sensitivity,
bandwidth, frequency, delay, decoder limits, interrogation rate, and power output.
Remarks Utilizes several items of portable ground support equipment to perform a vehicle subsystem
test. An option allows either vehicle power or ground power
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power r_
Total Personnel 3 : Engr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/16/89 Shifts 1
m
Pneumatics D CCLS
Tech 1 Insp 1
m m
Safety
Serial Operation _ Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT C-Band Transpoonder Test Set
Coaxial Cables
V
l Rationale: Delete for Lunar/Mars surface use, replace with a functional demonstration of |
/
beacon system. J
V
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
[ CTP: C-BAND XPONDER RANGE READOUT '., 1
Old CTP NO. RF-3008 New CTP No. RF-1005
Description Operates the airborne C-Band transponder system to enable range control to verify proper
operation of receivers, transmitters, and decoders. Transponder frequency, sensitivity, pulse
width, pulse jitter, power, delay and decoder limits are changed.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power rx--] vehicle Power[E ] Pneumatics D CCLS[_]
"Total Personnel 2 : Engr 2 Tech Insp S=fety
i • =mmmamm i i i
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/21/89 Shifts 1 Serial Operation O Parallel Operation [_]
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
fPSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln JXJ Reduce LJ Delete L] 1
I Ratlonale: A similar test would most likely be performed from the earth or a planetary surface
control station prior to launch. Also a function of whether it is incorporated into the
LEV/MEVdesign.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
[ CTP" RF PACKAGE REPLACEMENT (C-BAND AND/OR S-BAND)
Old CTP NO. RF-3009 New CTP No. RF-0006
Description Provides instructions for the removal of the C-band transponder, and the S-Band transmitter.
Remarks
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power O Vehicle Power D
"Total Personnel 3_: Engr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date Shifts 1
m
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Pneumatics D CCLS r'_
Tech Insp smfety
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
V
;S RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce
Rationale: Retain for post maintenance/replacement function.
Delete
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V
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: CENTAUR SPACECRAFT RANGE SAFETY COMMAND CHECKOUT
Old CTP No. RSC-3007 New CTP No. RSC-1004
Description Performs a functional checkout of the Centaur/Spacecraft range safety command system in
closed loop configuration with the Centaur insulation panels installed. Test include sys
response, immunity, telemetry verification, stray voltage, and receiver performance
measurements.
Procedure also used for replacement receiver testing or retesting within 90 days of launchRemarks
J
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _] Vehicle Power r_
Total Personnel 5 : Engr 1
mamm mm
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 08/07189 Shifts 2
am
...um.,,o,l--I
Tech 2 Insp 2 S=fety
m mm am
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT RSC Test Set
Dummy Destruct Unit (Green Box)
Squid Simulator
Power Meter
Coax Cable Adapter
Attenuator
Frequency Counter
Special Test Plug
L Rationale: Delete: Range safety system not required; planetary base not manned for Option 5 |
/
launch or landing operations. J
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
I I | I
CTP: REPETITIVE PARAMETER MEASURMENTS PCM
Old CTP NO. TLM-3001 New CTP No. TLM-1001
Description Repeats telemetry parameter measurement verification due to system lests, major integrated
tests, replacement of components affecting a parameter, or an engineering decision.
Remarks Performs telemetry system power on and off checks including PCM bit rate, hardline output
voltage, carrier deviation, antenna coupler output, and carrier frequency
PneumatiCs r_ CCLS [_
Tech 2 Inap 1 Ssfety
m m m
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power _ Vehicle Powar_
"Total Personnel 4 : Engr 1
m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06122/89 , Shifts 2 8
m
Serial Operation D
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Digital Voltmeter
RF Power Meter
Strip Chart Recorders
Coax Cables & Coupler Hat
Parallel Operation _]
I PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln L.J Reduce JxJ Delete L.J
Ratlonale: Measurements should be used to validate a Lunar/Mars vehicle and only repeated
if trouble is suspected or indicated, or components have been repaired/replaced.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
L iCTP: TRANSDUCER ELEMENT RESISTANCE CHECKS
Old CTP No. TLM-3003A New CTP No. TLM-1002
Description Performs element resistance checks/simulations of P&W engine Atlas/Centaur cryogenic
temperature transducers. Resistance tests are done at ambient temperature only for a single
data point and a resistance excursion test is performed with an aerosol spray.
Remarks Requires vehicle power off, disconnection and removal of transducer connectors and mounting
hardware to apply thermal conduction compound and installation of breakout boxes. Power on
E]
._imldAlinn._ _rA nArfnrmAd
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r'J vehicle Power O
total Personnel 5 : Engr
m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Pneumatics CCLS
Tech 3 Inap 1 Safety
m m =mlamw
Start Date 06122189 Shifts 5 Serial Operation
EQUIPMENT Ohmmeter
Breakout Boxes
SPECIAL TEST
Parallel Operation J'_
[PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain L_J ' Reduce [_J Delete xL_j 1
l Rationale: Delete from Lunar/Mars surface operations. Propellants remain on board and
configuration should not be broken. Perform on Earth and/or SSF prior to
departure for the Moon.
CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
f ii
[CTP: INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL CHECKS ,,
Old CTP NO. TLM-3004A New CTP NO. TLM-1003
Description Performs measurement verification using temperature and pressure stimulation, functional
verification and performs preflight close out inspections of instrumentation flight boxes.
Remarks Requires flight hardware disconnects and openings to accomplish tests, requires telemetry
ground station and flight vehicle power up
AC68 RESOURCES:
Pneumatics D CCLS [_]
Tech 3 Insp 1 Safety ._--
mlimlm= m
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power _]
=rotal Personnel 5 : Engr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 06/22/89 Shifts 15
m
Serial Operation D Parallel Operation I'_
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT Ohmmeter
Breakout Boxes
Pressurization Equipment with Gaging
Leak Detector Kit (Cryo)
V
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retain Reduce Delete
Rationale: Delete for planned Lunar/Mars surface operations. Use system until it indicates
maint, repair, calibration are required. Perform on Earth and/or SSF prior to
departure for the Moon.
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
v
CTP" TELEMETRY SYSTEM READINESS
Old CTP No. TLM-3008 New CTP No. TLM-1006
Description Verifies proper telemetry system and airborne instrumentation configuration for flight.
Verifies protective covers, interface connectors, lanyards, cables, and telemetry ground
station are configured for launch.
Remarks Totally manual operation, no ground or vehicle power required
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power D Vehicle Power D PneumatlcsO CCLSI'I
Total Personnel 3_: Engr 1 Tech 1 Insp 1 Safetym m m m
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 09/15/89 Shifts 3 Serial Operation D
Imlmmm
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT
Parallel Operation r_l
L Rationale: Delete except for post maintenance/replacement verification. Proper operation |
/
should be verified by functional tests performed by BITE/BITE. J
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CENTAUR TEST PROCEDURE
CTP: PCM DOWNLINK LSB/TGS SIGNAL CONDITIONING CHECKOUT
Old CTP No. TLM-3014 New CTP No. TLM-1008
Description
Remarks
I
Performs checkout of the PCM downlink launch service building (LSB) interface monitor panel
(IMP) to the telemetry ground station (TGS), IMP coaxial links and electronics, transmission
of decommutator simulators to LSB and return to TGS, and TGS S-Band receivers to Decom
functional test.
Verifies telemetry ground system and PCM downlink prior to flight vehicle checkout
AC68 RESOURCES:
Ground Power r_ Vehicle Power D
;rotal Personnel 3 : Engr
AC68 SCHEDULE DATA:
Start Date 05/17/89 Shifts 2
SPECIAL TEST
Pneumatics D CCLS
Tech 2 Insp
Serial Operation
EQUIPMENT Oscilloscapes
Digtal Voltmeters
FM Signal Generator
Frequency Synthesizer
Electronic Counter
Ssfety
Parallel Operation D
PSS RECOMMENDATION: Retaln IXI Reduce U Delete I I
Ratlonale: Perform an automated version following initial deployment of planetary surface
support equipment and then only repeat portions as required for maintenance and
repairs.
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Appendix F
Planetary Surface Systems
Input Forms
ContainingLaunch andLanding
Precursor Engineering Data Needs
for Lunar and Mars Missions
This appendix contains the parameters that must be known before any lunar or martian missions
can be undertakenfroma launchand landingperspective.Thc inputformsweredcvelopcdby the
Planetary Surface Systems Office. Input Form 1 re.cords the parameter or requirement, the
systems impacted by the parameter, and the rationale for obtaining this data. Input Form 2,
records the precision to which the parameter must be known, and the consequences of not
obtaining the requirext parameter or requirement prior to conducting a lunar or martian mission.
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VAppendix G
Mission Profile
for
Reference Archite, cua_ Option 5A
• The mission prof'de was developed using the data as provided the PSS Reference Architecture
Document 90-2, "Reference Architecture Description Option 5A." The profile was developed to
assist the MDSSC-KSC office in developing hunch and landing scenarios, based on the Reference
Architecture Option 5A. Significant launch and landing parameters are given on a flight-by-flight
basis as wen as the year in which the flight witl occur. This data was used to develop inputs to the
Planetary Surface Systems Office for the advanced development planning which occurred in the
winter of 1990.
V
MISSION PROFILE*
LAUNCH AND LANDING FUNCTIONAL AREA
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Payload requirements determined
for cargo vehicle
Vehicle design determined
Flight 0 (Cargo flight)
• Unpressurized rover delivered
• TNIM (landing aids)
• Payload unloader
• Excavation pyrotechnics
Flight 1 (Cargo flight)
• Initial Hab module
• Airlock #1 w/Dustoff
• SP 100 power module
• Vehicle is expended on lunar surface
Flight 2 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 30 days
• LLOX demonstration
• EMUs delivered
Launch and landing and ejecta protection required for
first manned landing
Flight 3 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 30 days
• EMUs
• Unpressurized manned/robotic rover
• Vehicle is expended in LLO after 2nd
manned mission
Flight 4 (Cargo flight)
• Lab module
• Airlock #2
• Vehicle is expended on the lunar surface
Flight 5 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 90 days
• LEV servicer
• EMUs
Thermal protection required
_AR
1994
1995
2002
2003
2004
2004
2005
2006
2007
2007
G- 1
_OJ
Flight 6 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 90 days
• Unpressurized rover
Flight 7 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 90 days
• Pressurized manned rover - extended range
• Vehicle is expended in LLO after
3 manned missions
Flight 8 (Cargo vehicle)
• Constructible Hab and associated subsystems
• Airlock #3
• Constructible logistics module
• Vehicle is expended on the lunar surface
Flight 9 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 180 days
• Complete constructible Hab module
Flight 10 (Cargo vehicle)
• 550 kW nuclear power plant
• LLOX production plant
• LLOX fueling pallet
• Mining excavator/loader
• Regolith hauler
• Vehicle is expended on the lunar surface
Flight 11 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
• Mars simulation mission begins
• Flight 11 vehicle is launched after landing of
of flight 12
Flight 12 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 240 days
• Complete 600 day Mars mission simulation
First flight to Mars
• Mission time of 600 days
• Crew size of 12
• No resupply support
• No use ISRU products for this mission
• 20 kW power available for mission
_AR
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2014
13- 2
Flight 13 (Mannedvehicle)
• Crewof 4
• Crew stay time of 180 days
• Unpressurized manned rover
• Begin usage of LLOX
Flight 14 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 180 days
• Pressurized transport module
• Unpressurized manned rover
• Vehicle is expended in LLO after 5
manned missions
Flight 15 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
• Unpressurized manned rover
Flight 16 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
Flight 17 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
Flight 18 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
• Deliver last identified science payload
Flight 19 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 360 days
• Vehicle is expended in LLO after 5
manned missions
Flight 20 (Manned vehicle)
• Crew of 4
• Crew stay time of 30 days
• Lunar far-side sonic (30 days)
• Unpresanrized manned rover
_AR
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
* Profile based on "Reference Architecture Description Option 5a." PSS Reference
Architecture Document 90-2. Planet Surface Systems Office. NASA. Interim Review
May 22-24.
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Appendix H
Launch and Landing Turnaround Scenarios
for
Reference Architecture Option 5A
" The launch and landing scenarios in this appendix were developed using the baseline turnaround
scenario which was developed under the base period of the Lunar Transportation Facilities and
Operations Study as well as the mission profile contained in Appendix G. Two mission mission
turnaround scenarios are contained in this appendix. A turnaround scenario for a cargo vehicle
(unmanned) can be found on page H-l, while the launch and landing turnaround scenario for the
manned vehicle begins on H-6.
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Launch and Landing Operations
VAppendix I
Tasks, Durations, SSE and
Potential Robotic Applications
for
Manned and Unmanned Vehicle
Launchand LandingOperations
Based on the launch and landing turnaround scenario for Reference Architecture Option 5A, the
datainthisappendixwas generated.Along withthetimclinestimates,potentialSurfaceSupport
Equipmentwas definedaswellaswhichofthehunch and landingtaskscouldbe automated
throughtheuseofrobotics.The dataforunmanned/cargovehiclecanbc foundon page I-land
thcdataformanned vehiclesbeginson pageI-3.
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Appendix J
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to
Reusable and Expendable Vehicles
Appendix J
Launch and Landing Task Applicability
to
Reusable and Expendable Vehicles
"To compare which of the tasks of the Reference Architecture Option 5A launch and landing tasks
would be applicable to either a reusable or an expendable vehicle a tasks-by-task comparison was
made. The results are documented in this appendix.
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Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV)
Servicer Maintenance Analysis
!Appendix K
Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV)
Servicer Maintenance Analysis
This appendix contains a vuchart docun_ntation of the Servicer Maintenance Analysis that was
performed by MDSSC-KSC. The analysis was a front-end analysis which selected a candidate
system for analysis. A maintenance concept for the servicer was developed along with
• groundrules and assumptions necessary to def'me the system and its operation. An existing system
was selected for comparison purposes. Then, the operations and support tasks that must be
performed were identified. From this analysis, conceptual system support requirements were
identified.
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Appendix L
Planet Surface System Logistics
Modeling Support Inputs
Support was provided to the PSS Logistics Manager at JSC in the development of initial design
cost inputs on the Lunar Excursion Vehicle Servicer to help test the System Design Utility (SDU)
•and the Equipment Design Cost Analysis models. These models were being evaluated for
standardization of the PSS logistics modeling effort and for use in determining logistic support
impacts on system design and life cycle cost. The inputs provided by MDSSC-KSC are contained
in this appendix.
° Q o o o o o o o o. o o. o Q o. o . o. _ o. q o.
L, ,
0 0 ..... == --
• • I 0 0 0 0 0
C_ = i " 'o m.o. o o
_. ° o.o o °_
tl_ _ i i t i ! i i i i
........... y
___" ° °o o °o_=
° °ooooooooooooooooo .ooo
z o ......... !_! ................
_ o r< r-: t,.: r.: ..' _ ,.._'_ ,.< ,.< ,,: _i u_ u';i_ r.: ._ _ r..: _!
-°.- = o o I i o I °ooo
_ , , _
¢) _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- I _ i_;_ _oiooo°oooO^^__oo°o! _.ooo
f_ _ ,-* _'! ;7_ r,D (D (D r,D .,,--i (_ .,,- _ I C0 ¢_1 _1 CXl ',,- 04 -- (D _,
21._ ;' o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
•" • 0 0!0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00. O_ 00 00. 0 0 0 0
! : ! I ! I ; ; ;
!_ q °. o;o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o q o o o.
=.. -,,'," =. 2 o o =,', =,', _ u _ o = = m _ :/:,_
,_u.
L .
•. i L'E0_ +-
,m, _._ +.oO. ! o. i olo, o i':+.oo
o _ ,- ,_ _. _ + -'++..:++ +m ,.no
_. +++++++_.+o+o++i+++o + +i +: :o'olo '+.o o
|_+ :+ram++ + m + ,,.+,+,,+ mimm
"++L+++ ............ "+ -
+lj __+ o .+ o o+ ,,,+++,.,, o. o o
i.,+ ++ ! J L L.
z L + :
+m _o _ _........... + ......... : ,,,__
_ U _ e!.Im _+m m ,n 0_ _n o _ m _n m +0 m o mira., ,!. o. _.+o o m m m;
• 4_ _1 ....... ('+3 ..... • +,_t ,,_ +, I% li") I'_; " " "+ " "i
, n- j " _lm .,_+m e,'> m .- _ .- __i m m m ..-. m+.- ,-t"- '- _ _ _-- P_ P- mr,- --It + ' ' : ' '+ m ....
• :i .......... ++i:::+i'+ ' ;:''i"
< 1+ + +.o o+ , o+ + ,,,+,,,,,, mo+o + ,
" "- 0'o o'o'o'o oio o o o o " I " " " o + + I
_: _++ . ............ ooooo, o.o .ooo0oo. 0
i _ 'l;+_ °'+° ° ° ° ° o ° o ° ° ° ° o ° o o o o °" °+° ° °+° o o+ __ , +m+mmmmm_+++mmmmmm+_mmm_ .... mm ++_+
=+ _ i i + +_I ! - _'
....+....+......
+_ m _ m m m]m mto _. m m m'm m+o 0+ = m _ o. m o. o. m m m
..... t ........ i ..... + ....
o o o o o o._o o ,o, o o+ o o+c=, o o o o o+o o o o o o
+ .... +" '-t ..... I'- "-+..... + " "- .....
+ + ! i +...... + P
_IP I_ I_ 0 0 +- _) ¢0 I_ I_ 0 0 _ t_ CO _ P,. _ f_ C_ OI C_ _ _0 I_
• _ • o; c_ r.: " " • • o; o r.,: " c_ ,,_ .,_1 • .... _ •
"- ___L_,_++,' .... ".iL .I_...
J" o o o o o o o o o o o/o o o o o o.o.lo.J o o o o o o o o
-'++_+_,.:,.,+_,.,,+,.,+,.,.+,,+,.,+,.,+,.,+_L,.,+_,,+,.,.++++;ml,.:,,++,. ,, ++_+.,+
+ ............... +...... ; + ......
I +.oo ooo oooO. ooooooooo + mo. lo.!oooo o• ,n • • • u+ • " _ " " " _ " " _ vJ • ;_ • • • v+ v+3; _ ;: c_ e+ e+ ,- e+ ,- _ (_ o+ 0+ ,- e_ ,.- '- ..... 1_ ;.:!_ u+ m e+ ,- ,.-
'_ ,-,+ e + e_+ m + + e_+ e,+ + + +;I+ + _L_.m+ + m+ _=
L-2
h

VAppendix M
Vehicle Servicing and Processing
Work Breakdown Structure
V
VAppendix M
Vehicle Servicing and Processing
Work Breakdown Strucua¢
MDSSC-KSC provided support to the Planetary Surface Systems Office in the planning of
advanced development activities. One of the firsts inputs was the submittal of a Work Breakdown
Structure (WB_). The WBS was b_ on the Mission Profile and the Turnaround Scenarios
• contained in Appendices G and H.
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v
1.0
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.2
1.1.2
1.1.2.1
1.1.2.2
1.1.2.3
1.1.3
1.1.3.1
1.1.3.2
1.1.3.3
1.1.4
1.1.4.1
1.1.4.2
1.1.4.3
1.1.4.4
1.1.4.5
1.1.4.6
1.1.4.7
1.1.4.8
1.1.4.9
NOTES:
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.1.1
1.2.1.2
1.2.2
1.2.2.1
1.2.2.2
1.2.2.3
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Lunar Deliverables
LEV Servicer
Fluid Processing System
(Reliquefaction/Refrigeration, Collection & Storage, Heat Transfer,
Propellant Transfer, Process Control)
Electrical Power and Data Processing
(Power Generation, Storage, & Control, Instrumentation, Communication,
Test & Checkout)
LEV Thermal Control
Transportation & Storage System (No Advanced Development)
(Movement to and from a protected environment between missions.)
Thermal/Micrometeoroid Protection (No Advanced Development)
Fabric/Cover
Support Structure & Deployment Mechanisms
Transportation & Storage System
Engine Ejecta Protection (No Advanced Development)
Berm/Blast Fence Construction
Pad Surface Paving
Protective Covers/Structures
Launch & Landing SSE (No Advanced Development)
Landing/Navigation Aids
Auxiliary Lighting Kit
L&L Access Equipment
L&L Tools & Test Equipment Kit
LLOX Pallet
Life Support Servicer (Not required for Option 5A)
Fuel Cell Servicer (Not required for Option 5A)
Waste Management System Servicer (Not required for Option 5A)
Range Safety Systems (Not required for Option 5A)
• Cargo Unloader & Transporter - Assumed to be provided by
Construction & Mining
• Rovers for crew & equipment transfer - Assumed to be provided by
Surface Transportation
Mars Deliverables
MEV Servicer Design Changes
Capacity Changes (MEV Propellant Load, Lower Boiloff Rate Changes)
Environmental Changes (Lower Temperature Extremes, Possible Liquid
"Air"/Dry Ice Formation, Airborne Dust, Radiator Wind Loads, Atmospheric
Convection Losses)
Thermal/Micrometeoroid Protection Design Changes (No Advanced
Development)
Lower Thermal & Micrometeoroid Load
Consider Wind Loading
Dust Storm Proof the Fabric Joints & Access Openings
M- 1
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1.2.3
1.2.3.1
1.2.3.2
1.2.3.3
1.2.4
1.2.4.1
1.2.4.2
2.0
.2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.1.1.
2.2.1.2
2.2.1.3
2.2.2
2.2.2.1
2.2.2.2
2.2.2.3
2.2.3
2.2.3.1
2.2.3.2
2.2.3.3
2.2.4
2.2.4.1
2.2.4.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
2.3.6
2.4
2.4.1
Engine Ejecta Protection Design (No Advanced Development)
Effect of Higher Thrust & Atmosphere on Eject Trajectories
Effect of Different Soil Characteristics on Berm Construction
Availability of ISRU Paving Materials
Launch & Landing SSE Design Changes (No Advanced Development)
Changes Driven by LEV-MEV Differences (Tools & Test Equipment, Access
Equipment)
Changes Driven by Differences in Other SSE (Tools & Test Equipment)
SYSTEM INTEGRATION
Simulation & Modeling
Testbeds
LEV/MEV Servicer Testbed
Performance Verification (Fluid Transfer, Reiiquefaction, Conditioning,
Gaging; Thermal control; Health Monitoring and Control)
Reliability Testing
Maintainability Verification
ISRU/LEV/MEV Fluid Transfer Testbed
NOTE: Testhed is assumed to be provided by ISRU
Performance Verification (Fluid Transfer, Reliquefaction, Conditioning,
Gaging; Thermal Control; Health Monitoring and Control)
1/6-G simulation
I/3-G Simulation
LEV/MEV Mockups
NOTE: Testbed is assumed to be provided by STV
LEV/MEV to SSE Interface/Compatibility Verification
LEV/MEV O&M Pr0cedure/Application Software Validation
(O&M, Health Monitoring and Control)
LEV/MEV O&M Emphasizing PSS Access, Repair, & Maintainability
Verification _ __.....
Surface Equipment Life Test Testbed
NOTE: Testbed is assumed to be provided by PSS
SSE Service Life & Reliability Testing (Cryo Storage, Cryo Materials, Fluid
Connections)
SSE Access & Maintainability Verification
Cross-Cutting Analysis
Operations
Logistics
Automation
Robotics/Telerobotics
Human Factors
Safety, Reliability, Maintenance & Quality Assurance
Interfaces with Other Systems
LEV/MEV (Service Requirements & Interface Definition)
M-2
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v
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5
2.4.6
2.4.7
2.4.8
3.0
3.1
•3.I.I
3.1.2
3.2
4.0
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
5.0
5.1
ISRU (Propellant Reliquefaction & Storage)
Construction & Mining (Cargo Unloading & Transportation. LEV/MEV
Servicer Prime Mover & Power Recharge)
Surface Transportation (Crew & Equipment)
Command & Data Systems (LEV/MEV/SSE O&M)
Power (LEV/MEV/SSE Power)
Processing Robotics (LEV/MEV/SSE O&M)
Operations & Logistics (Spares & Consumables. Expendable LEV/MEV
Cannibalization)
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
System Development
Lunar Deliverables
Mars Deliverables
System Integration
PROCLrREblENT
Lunar Deliverables
LEV Servicer
Therm al/Micrometeoroid
Engine Ejecta Protection
Launch & Landing SSE
Protection
Mars Deliverables
LEV Servicer
Therm ai/Micrometeoroid
Engine Ejecta Protection
Launch & Landing SSE
Protection
FACL1TIESDEVELOPMENT
LEV/MEV Servicer Testbed
M-3
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Advanced Development Schedule
and
Task Description Sheets
• Based on the mission profile and the work breakdown structure developed as inputs to the
PlanetarySurfaceSystemsadvanceddevelopmentplanning,tasksrequiredtodeveloplaunchand
landing hardware were identified. Using these tasks a schedule was developed. This schedule is
contained in this appendix on page N- 1. A description of what these tasks are and the estimation
of the manpower required to work these tasks were also defined. The spreadsheets containing this
information begins on page N-3.
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Description of Future Analysis
Work to Derive Launch and Landing Requirements
VAppendix O
Description of Future Analysis
Work to Derive Launch and Landing Requirements
Another advanced development planning activity was the development of launch and landing
requirements. The requirements were generated by reviewing the study and analysis work
• performed over the last year (both in support of the PSS office and NASA-KSC) and identifying
those items which would become requirements for a lunar/Mars mission. The requirements were
to be broad system requirements (Level m. This appendix is a description of the studies and
analyses that will be required to derive adequate requirements for lunar surface launch and landing
operations. Each page describes the launch and landing advanced development requirement, its
rationale, a description of the task associated with the development requirements (future work),
and the risks associated with not pursuing the future work.
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Appendix P
Comparison of the MASE Architectures
with the PSS Implementation Strategies for
Exploration Emphasis
Expanding Human Presence
Evolution Emphasis (Modified or Research Emphasis)
This appendix provides a comparison of the characteristics of the MASE architectures with the
implementation strategies of the Planetary Surface Systems Office.
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